Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant retained Law Firm as his counsel in two cases filed against Appellant by his brother. The parties settled. Thereafter, the circuit court (1) ordered Appellant to pay $130,000 to his attorney from proceeds deposited with the circuit court pursuant to the settlement agreement; (2) denied Appellant a jury trial on the attorney's fee issue; and (3) refused to allow an appeal bond pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-676.1(C), which would have suspended execution of its award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) had jurisdiction to resolve Law Firm's fee dispute with Appellant; (2) did not err in overruling Appellant's jury trial request; and (3) erred in refusing Appellant's request to post an appeal bond and suspend the award, but because the court's award to Law Firm was proper, the error was harmless.View "Henderson v. Ayres & Hartnett, P.C." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child, aggravated sexual battery, and animate object penetration. Defendant appealed, contending that the Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland by suppressing evidence in the form of an audio tape recording of an investigative interview with the victim. The court of appeals reversed on the Brady issue and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the recording was made available to Defendant in sufficient time for its use at trial, the Commonwealth committed no Brady violation. Remanded.View "Commonwealth v. Tuma" on Justia Law

For fifteen years, litigation between Hugh Caperton and his companies and Donald Blankenship and his companies involved trips to many courts, including suits in circuit courts in Virginia and West Virginia, proceedings in the U.S. district court for the southern district of West Virginia, and appeals to the Supreme Courts of Virginia, West Virginia Supreme Court and the U.S. In this case, Caperton and his companies filed suit in Virginia in 2010, bringing many of the same tort claims as they did in 1998 in the circuit court of West Virginia. In the 1998 case, the Supreme Court of West Virginia ultimately determined that a forum selection clause in an agreement between the parties required that suit be brought in Virginia. In this case, the circuit court held that res judicata barred Plaintiffs' claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in determining that res judicata operated to bar Plaintiffs' action. Remanded. View "Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted upon a charge of knowingly and intentionally possessing or transporting a firearm after having previously been convicted of a violent felony in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-308.2(A). At a jury trial, the trial court admitted one prior conviction for robbery and four prior convictions for burglary, each of which was a violent felony. Defendant objected to the evidence, arguing that the phrase "previously convicted of a violent felony" in section 18.2-308.2(A) limited the Commonwealth to adducing evidence of only one prior conviction for a violent felony. The circuit court overruled the objection, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because section 18.2-308.2(A) establishes the elements of the offense rather than a rule of evidence by which the elements may be proven, the statute does not limit the Commonwealth's prerogative to meet its burden of proof using whatever available evidence it chooses.View "Boone v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Board of Supervisors of Fluvanna County filed a complaint against Davenport & Company asserting that Davenport, which served as the financial advisor to the Board, knowingly made false representations and used its fiduciary position to persuade the Board to hire Davenport as an advisor regarding the financing of the construction of a new high school. Davenport filed a demurrer to the complaint, which the circuit court granted on the basis that the separation of powers doctrine prevented the court from resolving the controversy because the court would have to inquire into the motives of the Board's legislative decision making. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board effectively waived its common law legislative immunity from civil liability and the burden of litigation, and therefore the circuit court erred in sustaining Davenport's demurrer on these grounds.View "Bd. of Supervisors of Fluvanna County v. Davenport & Co. LLC" on Justia Law

Malyevac and ADI entered into an agreement under which Malyevac sold ADI's computer products and services to its customers. The agreement contained noncompete, non-solicitation, non-disclosure, and return of confidential information provisions. A few months after entering into the agreement, Malyevac resigned. ADI filed a complaint, alleging that Malyevac was violating the agreement by performing work and services and selling products in direct competition with ADI, by engaging in other prohibited activities, and by failing to return confidential information. Malyevac claimed that the provisions were overbroad and unenforceable. The trial court sustained a demurrer without granting ADI leave to amend its complaint. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the merits of the claim cannot be determined on a motion for dismissal. View "Assurance Data, Inc. v. Malyevac" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are the estranged great grandchildren of Elsie and legatees to one half of her residuary estate under a will dated 2004 and admitted to probate following Elsie's death in 2010. The defendants are Audrey, Elsie's sister and legatee to the remaining half of her residuary estate, and Elsie’s former neighbors, Toni, Bruce, and Mike. Elsie's will nominated Toni as executrix; Toni and Audrey took possession of significant assets from Elsie during Elsie’s life. Toni and Bruce began providing assistance to Elsie and her husband in 2004 under a contract providing that Toni and Bruce would be paid $500 per week and would receive $8000 for assistance given in the past. The agreement provided that Toni and Bruce would be paid from her estate, rather than during her lifetime. The trial court found that that Toni, while acting as an agent under the power of attorney, did not arrange for Elsie’s assets to pass at death to the defendant, that the assets in question were retitled by Elsie personally. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Toni was in a confidential relationship with Elsie and the burden was on the defendants to rebut the presumption that the transactions were the result of undue influence. View "Ayers v. Shaffer" on Justia Law

Jordan was charged with carjacking, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, eluding police, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At trial, Arrowood, who was 13 at the time of the incident, testified that as he sat in a truck outside a convenience store, Jordan pointed "a gun" at his head and told him to get out of the truck. Arrowood stated that he was familiar with handguns because his father was in the military, and that this appeared to be a silver semiautomatic pistol. Arrowood admitted on cross-examination that he could not say for certain that the object was not a toy gun. Jordan was apprehended by police shortly after the incident, but no weapon was recovered. He was convicted on all counts. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected an appeal to the conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Jordan concedes that he is a convicted felon. The evidence was sufficient to support Jordan's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. View "Jordan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Leone was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in 1994. Because of that conviction, Leone suffered certain political disabilities. In 2012, Governor McDonnell restored all of Leone's civil rights except his right to ship, transport, possess or receive firearms. Leone filed a petition to have that right restored in accordance with Code § 18.2-308.2(C). The trial court granted Leone's petition, noting that the restoration did not include the right to carry a concealed weapon. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, noting Leone admits that he does not currently reside in Virginia Beach, and did not reside in Virginia Beach when he filed his petition for restoration; the circuit court lacked territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate Leone's petition for restoration of firearms rights. View "Commonwealth v. Leone" on Justia Law

In 2005, Angstadt acquired a Fredericksburg parcel, identified on the tax map as a single lot. City records indicated that in 1942 it had been listed as two separate “tax parcels.” In 2008, Angstadt obtained a survey, which drew lines that corresponded to the boundaries of the two parcels shown in 1942. Angstadt recorded the survey, but did not submit it for approval as a subdivision, and subsequently transferred the two purported lots to his company, PBU, by separate deeds. PBU conveyed one lot, containing an apartment building, to Nejati and the other, undeveloped, lot to Stageberg. The Zoning Administrator concluded that a house could not be built because the undeveloped lot did not exist as a separate lot, pursuant to Code § 15.2-2254 and the city code. After exhausting administrative remedies and reaching a settlement with the title insurance company, Stageberg filed a quiet title action against Nejati, alleging that the legal effect of the 2008 deeds from PBU was to create a tenancy in common of the undivided parcel acquired by Angstadt in 2005. The trial court held that the claimed estates in severalty were impermissible because they would circumvent the requirements for a valid subdivision and concluded that the parties were tenants in common of the whole property. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, noting that the deeds unambiguously described the property conveyed and that the parties own the property in severality. View "Nejati v. Stageberg" on Justia Law