Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of animate object sexual penetration. Prior to his sentencing, Defendant hired a new attorney, who discovered that the Commonwealth had made a plea offer prior to trial. The circuit court found that the plea offer was not conveyed to Defendant, declared a mistrial, and ordered a new trial. Defendant subsequently entered a plea of no contest, which the circuit court accepted. The court then sentenced Defendant to thirty years' imprisonment. Thereafter, Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for his first attorney's failure to communicate to him the plea offer from the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth dismissed the petition, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over Defendant's claim because Defendant was not being detained as a result of his first trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition, holding that, assuming that Defendant may link the first and second trials and assert ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant could not prove he was prejudiced by counsel's performance pursuant to Missouri v. Frye, which provides the standard for proving prejudice in the plea context. View "Laster v. Russell" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a Project that provided for the design and construction of a new Midtown Tunnel. The Commonwealth Transportation Board affirmed the Project and specifically approved and ratified the imposition and collection of tolls on the Project as contemplated by a Comprehensive Agreement entered into by Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) and Elizabeth River Crossings OpCo, LLC (ERC). Plaintiff and other individuals filed a complaint against ERC and VDOT, alleging, inter alia, that the General Assembly, through its enactment of the Public-Private Transportation Act (PPTA), unconstitutionally delegated its power of taxation to VDOT and ERC in violation of the Virginia Constitution. The circuit court concluded that the General Assembly exceeded its authority in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Project tolls were user fees and not taxes, and therefore, the General Assembly did not delegate its power of taxation to agencies such as VDOT in violation of the Virginia Constitution; (2) the General Assembly properly delegated to VDOT and ERC the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees in the form of tolls under the terms of the PPTA; and (3) the Comprehensive Agreement did not abridge the Commonwealth's police power. View "Elizabeth River Crossings OpCo, LLC v. Meeks" on Justia Law

George Huguely was convicted in 2012 of murdering his former girlfriend. Huguely's trial received extensive publicity. Virginia Broadcasting Corporation (VBC), the owner of a television station, filed a request to have a camera in the courtroom to broadcast Huguely's sentencing hearing. After a hearing, the trial court denied VBC's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err (1) by failing to apply a "good cause shown" standard in its initial determination whether to permit coverage of Huguely's sentencing hearing; and (2) in holding that VBC's newsgathering and reporting activities via electronic media were entitled to no protection under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or the Virginia Constitution. View "Virginia Broad. Corp. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 1989, Appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and attempting to commit forcible sodomy. In 2005, Appellant was found not to be a sexually violent predator pursuant to the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act. In 2008, Appellant was found guilty of violating his parole and was reincarcerated for his 1989 sexual offenses. Prior to his release from incarceration, the Commonwealth filed a second petition in 2011 to civilly commit Appellant as a sexually violent predator. Appellant moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that it was barred by res judicata. The circuit court denied the motion. The court subsequently found Appellant was a sexually violent predator and ordered him committed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Appellant's motion to dismiss, holding that the application of res judicata was inappropriate in this case where the 2011 petition was not dependent upon the same evidence as the 2005 proceeding, nor did the 2011 petition arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence. View "Rhoten v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After the mass shooting at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in 2007, the administrators of the estates of two of the victims of the shooting filed wrongful death suits against the Commonwealth, claiming that the Commonwealth was liable for the actions of the Commonwealth's employees at the university pursuant to the Virginia Tort Claims Act. Specifically, the administrators claimed that a special relationship existed between the Commonwealth's employees at the university and the victims that gave rise to the Commonwealth's duty to warn the victims of third party criminal acts. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Administrators. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, without deciding that a special relationship existed between the Commonwealth and the university students, no duty to warn students of harm by a third party criminal arose under the circumstances of this case. View "Commonwealth v. Peterson" on Justia Law

The City of Alexandria and the City Council (collectively, the City) granted a special use permit and license to 106 Union Dublin, LLC and 106 Union Ireland, LLC (collectively, the Union parties) allowing the Union parties to construct an outdoor dining deck on a public street named Wales Alley. Old Dominion Boat Club (ODBC) filed an action against the City and the Union parties, seeking to enforce an alleged private easement over Wales Alley that had been deeded prior to Wales Alley becoming a public street. ODBC sought a declaration that its vested easement existed and a permanent injunction against the City and the Union parties prohibiting them from obstructing its easement. The circuit court concluded that the City had accepted a fee simple interest in Wales Alley, and that acceptance had extinguished OBDC's easement pursuant to a local ordinance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the conversion of Wales Alley to a public street did not result in a cessation of the purpose for which the easement was granted, ODBC's easement over Wales Alley was not extinguished when Wales Alley became a public street. Remanded. View "Old Dominion Boat Club v. Alexandria City Council" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of malicious wounding. Appellant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove intent to maim, disfigure, disable or kill where Appellant struck the victim with a single blow with his bare fist. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, there was sufficient evidence of violence and brutality on the part of Appellant for the circuit court to find that Appellant acted with malice and intent to maim the victim even though he delivered only one blow with a closed fist. View "Burkeen v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Dr. Smith, a trauma surgeon, and Dr. Cashion, an anesthesiologist, provided emergency care to a critically injured patient. After the patient died during the surgery, Smith, in the presence of other medical personnel, criticized Cashion and repeatedly stated that Cashion "euthanized" the patient. Cashion filed an action against Smith and Smith's employer (collectively, Defendants) for defamation. The circuit court (1) sustained Defendants' demurrers and pleas in bar as to the non-euthanasia statements, ruling that they were non-actionable expressions of opinion; and (2) granted summary judgment to Defendants on the euthanasia statements, concluding that the qualified privilege applied to Smith's statements. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court's rulings that Smith's statements enjoyed a qualified privilege; but (2) reversed the circuit court's ruling that Smith's non-euthanasia statements were non-actionable expressions of opinion. Remanded. View "Cashion v. Smith" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of "Henrico County Ordinance 22-2 incorporating Virginia Code Section 18.2-308." Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. After Appellant's appeal was denied, he filed a motion for a rehearing, adding an additional assignment of error, which stated that the conviction was void as a matter of law because there existed no Henrico County Ordinance 22-2 incorporating Virginia Code Section 18.2-308. The court of appeals refused to address whether Appellant's conviction was void ab initio as a matter of law because Appellant had not included the new assignment of error in his petition for appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the court of appeals had acquired active jurisdiction over Appellant's appeal, Appellant had the right to raise the issue of whether his conviction order was void ab initio. Remanded. View "Amin v. County of Henrico" on Justia Law

The parties to this complex dispute were Plaintiffs, the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Virginia (the Diocese) and the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America (TEC), and Defendants, seven local congregations, including The Falls Church (collectively, the CANA congregations), Appellant in the present case. After The Falls Church disaffiliated from TEC, Plaintiffs filed complaints asserting that all personal and real property held by the CANA congregations was actually held in trust for TEC and the Diocese. The trial court found that Plaintiffs carried their burden of proving they had contractual and propriety interests in the church property at issue and granted relief to Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs had a proprietary interest in the properties, and therefore, a constructive denominational trust should be imposed in the properties; (2) the trial court correctly ordered Appellant to convey the property to Plaintiffs; and (3) the trial court erred in its disposition of personal property acquired by Appellant after the vote to disaffiliate. View "The Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S." on Justia Law