Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008 and 2009, Dr. Raley was employed by Minimally Invasive Spine Institute, PLLC (MISI), a medical practice owned and managed by Haider. Raley claimed MISI had failed to pay him all the money he earned and filed suit in 2010, claiming breach of contract and breach of implied contract against MISI. In Count II, Raley sued MISI as well as Haider, alleging that Haider wrongfully distributed money from MISI to himself, depleting MISI of funds in violation of Code § 13.1-1035, which governs distributions made by Virginia LLCs. The trial court agreed that Raley, who was not a member of MISI, could not bring a cause of action under Code § 13.1-1035, and dismissed Raley’s Count II claim. Raley was awarded $395,428.70 plus interest against MISI., but has been unable to collect the judgment. He filed a garnishment proceeding, naming Haider as the garnishee. Raley also filed a second complaint against Haider, Minimally Invasive Pain Institute, PLLC (MIPI) and Wise, LLC (Wise). The cases were consolidated. The trial court dismissed all counts, based upon the dismissal with prejudice of Count II of the original case. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that res judicata does not bar claims against MIPI and Wise and Raley’s Count I or garnishment claims against Haider, but does bar other claims against Haider. View "Raley v. Haider" on Justia Law

In 2008 Prieto was convicted of a 1988 capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape, Code § 18.2-31(5); capital murder of more than one person as part of the same act or transaction, Code § 18.2-31(7); rape, Code § 18.2-61; two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of murder, Code § 18.2-53.1; and grand larceny, Code § 18.2-95, and was sentenced to death for each of the capital murder convictions and 20 years' imprisonment for the remaining convictions. Following a remand, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the sentences and subsequently denied a petition for habeas corpus that claimed denial of effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed bring up Prieto's claimed mental retardation and failed to thoroughly investigate and review scientific evidence including DNA found in the victim’s vagina, hair found on the body, and anal swabs. The court also rejected a claims that Prieto was denied the right to a jury "of the state and district" where the crimes were committed, because a juror who did not reside in Virginia was seated at his first trial and that another juror intentionally withheld information during voir dire regarding sexual assaults the juror had suffered. View "Prieto v. Warden " on Justia Law

In 1998, Norfolk approved the Hampton Boulevard Redevelopment Project created by the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority pursuant to Code § 36-49, which authorizes such an authority to "adopt a redevelopment plan for a designated redevelopment area to address blighted areas" and Code § 36-51(A), which authorizes localities to approve redevelopment plans. The approval was based on a redevelopment study which determined that the area was blighted due to incompatible land uses, disrepair, environmental risks, demographic changes, and high crime rates. Properties were classified as good, fair, or poor; about 20 percent were classified as poor. The area was selected to assist in the expansion of Old Dominion University, immediately adjacent to the Redevelopment Project. Challenges to individual condemnations were rejected and a trial court upheld the finding of blight. In 2010 the Authority initiated condemnation of PKO’s apartment building. PKO appealed the adverse decision. The Virginia Supreme Court held that the court erred in permitting the Authority to acquire PKO's property after the effective date of the statutory limitation added by Code § 1-219.1, which provides that property taken for condemnation must itself be blighted at the time the petition for condemnation is filed. The limitation applies to all redevelopment and housing authorities operating pursuant to redevelopment plans adopted prior to January 1, 2007. It does not refer to the filing of a petition for condemnation or the institution of the acquisition of property, but instead limits the "ability of a redevelopment and housing authority ... to acquire property." View "PKO Ventures, LLC v. Norfolk Redev. & Housing Auth." on Justia Law

In 2007, Schuiling hired Harris as his full-time, live-in housecleaner. Harris signed an arbitration agreement, a one-page, pre-printed form prepared for Schuling’s auto business, stating that disputes “shall be resolved exclusively by arbitration administered by the National Arbitration Forum under its code of procedure then in effect.” In 2011, Harris sued Schuiling, alleging multiple torts, statutory violations, and breach of contract. Schuiling moved to enforce arbitration under Code § 8.01-581.02(A), stating that the National Arbitration Forum was no longer available and requesting the court to appoint a substitute arbitrator under Code § 8.01-581.03. Harris argued that unavailability of the named arbitrator, coupled with the agreement’s failure to provide for a substitute arbitrator, rendered the agreement unenforceable. The circuit court agreed with Harris and denied the motion to compel arbitration. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed. Relying on the intention of the parties as expressed in the language of the agreement, the court concluded that NAF’s designation as arbitrator was not integral and was severable in order to give effect to the arbitration requirement, the sole purpose of the agreement. View "Schuiling v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Clerk of the Circuit Court of the City of Fredericksburg, filed a putative class action in the federal district court against the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), alleging that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had failed to pay recordation taxes imposed by Code §§ 58.1-801 and -802. The federal court certified to the Virginia Supreme Court two questions: Under Virginia law, does a clerk of court possess statutory standing to initiate a lawsuit, in his official capacity, to enforce the real estate transfer tax; If a clerk of court does possess such authority, does Virginia law authorize him to do so as a class representative on behalf of all clerks of court throughout the Commonwealth? The court answered the first question “no” and did not address the second. The court characterized the clerk’s duties as ministerial and noted the statutory scheme for enforcement of the transfer tax. View "Small v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth's attorney for the City of Portsmouth informed Plaintiff, who hosted Texas Hold 'Em poker games and tournaments, that, to avoid prosecution, Plaintiff must cease and desist "all forms of illegal gambling." Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the game of Texas Hold 'Em constitutes illegal gambling under Va. Code Ann. 18.2-325 and whether Va. Code Ann. 18.2-328 was facially unconstitutional and should be found void for vagueness. The circuit court ruled against Plaintiff. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the judgment to the extent the circuit court ruled that Plaintiff failed to establish that Texas Hold 'Em was not illegal gambling under section 18.2-325, as the claim did not present a justiciable controversy, and the circuit court did not have the authority to exercise jurisdiction concerning such a claim; and (2) affirmed the court's judgment to the extent the court ruled that section 18.2-328 was not unconstitutional.View "Daniels v. Mobley" on Justia Law

Jack Bays, Inc. did site work on the construction of a new church (New Life). Jack Bays contracted with several subcontractors, eleven of which were parties to this action. New Life obtained additional funds for the project through three lenders. The Lenders were listed on the deed of trust for the new financing. After New Life stopped making to Jack Bays due to lack of funding, Jack Bays recorded its memorandum of mechanics' lien against New Life and terminated the construction contract. All Contractors timely filed complaints against the Lenders. The circuit court ordered that the property be sold at public auction with the proceeds to be applied in satisfaction of the mechanics' liens in the following order of priority: Subcontractors, Jack Bays, and Lenders. The Lenders appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in finding that Jack Bays' lien was valid; (2) was not plainly wrong in determining that the Contractors' liens had priority over the Lenders' deed of trust; but (3) erred in approving the sale of the entire parcel of land to satisfy the Contractors' liens, where no evidence was introduced to support this decision. Remanded.View "Glasser & Glasser, PLC v. Jack Bays, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, the City Council revoked a blanket special exception permitting two business establishments (the Establishments) operating in the City to operate as "entertainment establishments" serving alcoholic beverages for on-site consumption and denied their individual applications for special exceptions to continue such operations. The City later filed a complaint requesting that the Establishments be permanently enjoined from selling or serving alcohol or providing entertainment in their businesses. The Establishments filed a separate complaint and petition for appeal, asserting that the City Council's actions impaired their vested rights and that the manner in which the Council executed these actions violated their statutory notice and due process rights. The circuit court denied the relief requested by the Establishments and granted the City's request for injunctive relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Establishments did not acquire any vested rights under Va. Code 15.2-2307 or Va. Code 15.2-2311(C); and (2) because the Establishments had actual notice of and actively participated in the City Council meeting, any statutory notice issues were waived and their constitutional rights were not violated.View "Norfolk 102, LLC v. City of Norfolk" on Justia Law

Carolyn Osman had three sons, all of whom were the beneficiaries of Carolyn's estate and various trusts. Carolyn died in 2009 as a result of her son Michael's actions. Her cause of death was strangulation and blunt force trauma to the head. Michael was found not guilty of first-degree murder for reason of insanity. The executors of Carolyn's estate and co-trustees of the trusts subsequently filed a request for declaratory judgment in the circuit court asking the court to declare that Michael was a "slayer" under Va. Code 55-401. The circuit court found that although Michael was found not guilty by reason of insanity, he was a slayer under section 55-401 and could not share in the proceeds from his mother's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in holding that Michael was a slayer under section 55-401, and that as a result, Michael could not inherit his share of his mother's estate.View "Osman v. Osman" on Justia Law

Shearin Construction, Inc., acting through its agent, Jeffrey Tharpe, contracted with the United States government to perform excavation work at Fort Pickett. Shearin subsequently contracted with the Southside Regional Service Authority (Authority) to perform excavation work at another site. A dispute arose between the Authority and Shearin, after which J. Harman Saunders, the owner of Saunders Construction, told the Authority's executive director that "Tharpe told me that Tharpe was going to screw the Authority like he did Fort Pickett." This statement was repeated and republished by and to the Authority and the news media. Tharpe and Shearin (Plaintiffs) filed this defamation suit against Saunders and Saunders Construction (Defendants). Defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that the statement allegedly made by Saunders did not contain a provably false statement but was an expression of opinion. The circuit court sustained the demurrer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling the alleged defamatory statement was an expression of opinion and in sustaining the demurrer on that ground. Remanded.View "Tharpe v. Saunders" on Justia Law