Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Dr. Smith, a trauma surgeon, and Dr. Cashion, an anesthesiologist, provided emergency care to a critically injured patient. After the patient died during the surgery, Smith, in the presence of other medical personnel, criticized Cashion and repeatedly stated that Cashion "euthanized" the patient. Cashion filed an action against Smith and Smith's employer (collectively, Defendants) for defamation. The circuit court (1) sustained Defendants' demurrers and pleas in bar as to the non-euthanasia statements, ruling that they were non-actionable expressions of opinion; and (2) granted summary judgment to Defendants on the euthanasia statements, concluding that the qualified privilege applied to Smith's statements. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court's rulings that Smith's statements enjoyed a qualified privilege; but (2) reversed the circuit court's ruling that Smith's non-euthanasia statements were non-actionable expressions of opinion. Remanded. View "Cashion v. Smith" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of "Henrico County Ordinance 22-2 incorporating Virginia Code Section 18.2-308." Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. After Appellant's appeal was denied, he filed a motion for a rehearing, adding an additional assignment of error, which stated that the conviction was void as a matter of law because there existed no Henrico County Ordinance 22-2 incorporating Virginia Code Section 18.2-308. The court of appeals refused to address whether Appellant's conviction was void ab initio as a matter of law because Appellant had not included the new assignment of error in his petition for appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the court of appeals had acquired active jurisdiction over Appellant's appeal, Appellant had the right to raise the issue of whether his conviction order was void ab initio. Remanded. View "Amin v. County of Henrico" on Justia Law

The parties to this complex dispute were Plaintiffs, the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Virginia (the Diocese) and the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America (TEC), and Defendants, seven local congregations, including The Falls Church (collectively, the CANA congregations), Appellant in the present case. After The Falls Church disaffiliated from TEC, Plaintiffs filed complaints asserting that all personal and real property held by the CANA congregations was actually held in trust for TEC and the Diocese. The trial court found that Plaintiffs carried their burden of proving they had contractual and propriety interests in the church property at issue and granted relief to Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs had a proprietary interest in the properties, and therefore, a constructive denominational trust should be imposed in the properties; (2) the trial court correctly ordered Appellant to convey the property to Plaintiffs; and (3) the trial court erred in its disposition of personal property acquired by Appellant after the vote to disaffiliate. View "The Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S." on Justia Law

The Doctors Company (TDC), a professional liability insurance company, sought a determination that its coverage of policyholder Women's Healthcare Associates (WHA) did not apply to a pending breach of contract action relating to WHA's participation in the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act (the Birth Injury Fund). The Davidson family filed the underlying breach of contract action against WHA, alleging that they entered into an express contract with WHA partly in reliance on WHA's participation in the Birth Injury Fund, and WHA materially breached the contract by failing to pay into the fund as represented to the Davidsons. The circuit court ruled against TDC and in favor of WHA and the Davidsons, finding that the policy covered the claim alleged by the Davidsons in their complaint against WHA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the underlying action was covered by the insurance policy; and (2) therefore, TDC must both defend and indemnify WHA in the underling breach of contract action. View "The Doctors Co. v. Women's Healthcare Assocs." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of petit larceny, third or subsequent offense, and breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny. The court of appeals denied Petitioner's appeal. Petitioner subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court and filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging the legality of his confinement and asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's habeas petition, holding (1) a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a direct appeal from a final judgment of conviction can proceed simultaneously in the Court; and (2) with regard to the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in the petition, Petitioner failed to prove that, but for his counsel's alleged errors, the outcome of his trial would have been different.View "Sigmon v. Dir. of Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

A limited liability company (Company) filed an application for a special exception to build a Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) bus maintenance facility on a parcel of land in County. A County Board of Supervisors (Board) supervisor disclosed that the supervisor had received campaign contributions from attorneys representing Company, and two other supervisors disclosed that they were principal director and alternate director of WMATA. The Board approved the application. The three supervisors who had made disclosures each voted to approve the application. Plaintiffs filed a complaint (1) seeking a declaratory judgment that the Board's approval of the application was void because Va. Code Ann. 15-2-852(A) required the three supervisors to recuse themselves from consideration of the application, and (2) alleging that the Board's approval of the application was not fairly debatable. The circuit court sustained the Board's demurrer as to the applicability of section 15.2-852(A) and awarded summary judgment to the Board on the remainder of the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Newberry Station Homeowners Ass'n v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax County" on Justia Law

Appellant retained Law Firm as his counsel in two cases filed against Appellant by his brother. The parties settled. Thereafter, the circuit court (1) ordered Appellant to pay $130,000 to his attorney from proceeds deposited with the circuit court pursuant to the settlement agreement; (2) denied Appellant a jury trial on the attorney's fee issue; and (3) refused to allow an appeal bond pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-676.1(C), which would have suspended execution of its award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) had jurisdiction to resolve Law Firm's fee dispute with Appellant; (2) did not err in overruling Appellant's jury trial request; and (3) erred in refusing Appellant's request to post an appeal bond and suspend the award, but because the court's award to Law Firm was proper, the error was harmless.View "Henderson v. Ayres & Hartnett, P.C." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child, aggravated sexual battery, and animate object penetration. Defendant appealed, contending that the Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland by suppressing evidence in the form of an audio tape recording of an investigative interview with the victim. The court of appeals reversed on the Brady issue and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the recording was made available to Defendant in sufficient time for its use at trial, the Commonwealth committed no Brady violation. Remanded.View "Commonwealth v. Tuma" on Justia Law

For fifteen years, litigation between Hugh Caperton and his companies and Donald Blankenship and his companies involved trips to many courts, including suits in circuit courts in Virginia and West Virginia, proceedings in the U.S. district court for the southern district of West Virginia, and appeals to the Supreme Courts of Virginia, West Virginia Supreme Court and the U.S. In this case, Caperton and his companies filed suit in Virginia in 2010, bringing many of the same tort claims as they did in 1998 in the circuit court of West Virginia. In the 1998 case, the Supreme Court of West Virginia ultimately determined that a forum selection clause in an agreement between the parties required that suit be brought in Virginia. In this case, the circuit court held that res judicata barred Plaintiffs' claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in determining that res judicata operated to bar Plaintiffs' action. Remanded. View "Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted upon a charge of knowingly and intentionally possessing or transporting a firearm after having previously been convicted of a violent felony in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-308.2(A). At a jury trial, the trial court admitted one prior conviction for robbery and four prior convictions for burglary, each of which was a violent felony. Defendant objected to the evidence, arguing that the phrase "previously convicted of a violent felony" in section 18.2-308.2(A) limited the Commonwealth to adducing evidence of only one prior conviction for a violent felony. The circuit court overruled the objection, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because section 18.2-308.2(A) establishes the elements of the offense rather than a rule of evidence by which the elements may be proven, the statute does not limit the Commonwealth's prerogative to meet its burden of proof using whatever available evidence it chooses.View "Boone v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law