Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009, the City Council revoked a blanket special exception permitting two business establishments (the Establishments) operating in the City to operate as "entertainment establishments" serving alcoholic beverages for on-site consumption and denied their individual applications for special exceptions to continue such operations. The City later filed a complaint requesting that the Establishments be permanently enjoined from selling or serving alcohol or providing entertainment in their businesses. The Establishments filed a separate complaint and petition for appeal, asserting that the City Council's actions impaired their vested rights and that the manner in which the Council executed these actions violated their statutory notice and due process rights. The circuit court denied the relief requested by the Establishments and granted the City's request for injunctive relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Establishments did not acquire any vested rights under Va. Code 15.2-2307 or Va. Code 15.2-2311(C); and (2) because the Establishments had actual notice of and actively participated in the City Council meeting, any statutory notice issues were waived and their constitutional rights were not violated.View "Norfolk 102, LLC v. City of Norfolk" on Justia Law

Carolyn Osman had three sons, all of whom were the beneficiaries of Carolyn's estate and various trusts. Carolyn died in 2009 as a result of her son Michael's actions. Her cause of death was strangulation and blunt force trauma to the head. Michael was found not guilty of first-degree murder for reason of insanity. The executors of Carolyn's estate and co-trustees of the trusts subsequently filed a request for declaratory judgment in the circuit court asking the court to declare that Michael was a "slayer" under Va. Code 55-401. The circuit court found that although Michael was found not guilty by reason of insanity, he was a slayer under section 55-401 and could not share in the proceeds from his mother's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in holding that Michael was a slayer under section 55-401, and that as a result, Michael could not inherit his share of his mother's estate.View "Osman v. Osman" on Justia Law

Shearin Construction, Inc., acting through its agent, Jeffrey Tharpe, contracted with the United States government to perform excavation work at Fort Pickett. Shearin subsequently contracted with the Southside Regional Service Authority (Authority) to perform excavation work at another site. A dispute arose between the Authority and Shearin, after which J. Harman Saunders, the owner of Saunders Construction, told the Authority's executive director that "Tharpe told me that Tharpe was going to screw the Authority like he did Fort Pickett." This statement was repeated and republished by and to the Authority and the news media. Tharpe and Shearin (Plaintiffs) filed this defamation suit against Saunders and Saunders Construction (Defendants). Defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that the statement allegedly made by Saunders did not contain a provably false statement but was an expression of opinion. The circuit court sustained the demurrer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling the alleged defamatory statement was an expression of opinion and in sustaining the demurrer on that ground. Remanded.View "Tharpe v. Saunders" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned an underlying criminal case against Lillian Callender and Michael Stoffa. Following bench trials, Callender and Stoffa were found guilty of felony neglect and second-degree murder. Prior to Callender's sentencing and Stoffa's trial, Daily Press requested permission to review the file related to Callender's trial. The clerk of the circuit court denied the request, and the circuit court entered an order sealing the entire Callender file from public inspection until the conclusion of Callender's and Stoffa's cases. The circuit court later rescinded the order and allowed the attorneys for Callender and the Commonwealth to withdraw the original exhibits from the Callender file to be used in Stoffa's trial. Daily Press requested that photocopies of the withdrawn exhibits remain in the public file, but the court directed that photocopies of the original exhibits be placed in the file under seal. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court, holding that the order violated the public's constitutional and statutory right of access to criminal proceedings. View "Daily Press, Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A real estate developer (Developer), purchased property contained within a proposed sudivision. The County issued to Developer a total of fifty-two building permits, for which Developer paid a proffer fee of $12,000, which was $4,000 more than Developer expected to pay. In 2007, Developer filed an action asking the trial court to declare that the County could not lawfully assess the $4,000 fee. In 2011, after the fee had been paid on all fifty-two permits, the court found that the $4,000 fee was unlawful. In 2008, Developer instituted a restitution action seeking reimbursement of the fees. The trial court consolidated this restitution action and the declaratory judgment action for a bench trial. After ruling in Developer's favor in the declaratory judgment action, the court ruled in the restitution action that Developer was barred from being awarded reimbursement of the unlawful fees because it paid them "voluntarily" within the meaning of the voluntary payment doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in holding that Developer's action for reimbursement of the disputed fees was barred under the voluntary payment doctrine.View "D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

The Albemarle County Board of Supervisors disallowed payment on a portion of retirement benefits promised to several retired Albemarle County employees (collectively, Retirees). The benefits promised under the County's Voluntary Early Retirement Incentive Program (VERIP) were partially disallowed due to a miscalculation by a County employee prior to the retirements. The Retirees appealed. The County and Board (hereafter, the County) demurred, arguing that the Retirees failed to comply with Va. Code 15.2-1246 by not serving written notice of their appeal on the clerk of the Board. The circuit court overruled the demurrer and found in favor of Plaintiffs, awarding each of the Retirees the amount of the withheld VERIP stipend that the County claimed would amount to an overpayment if properly calculated under the program. The Supreme Court reversed and entered final judgment in favor of the County, holding that the statutorily required written notice of appeal was insufficient, and accordingly, the circuit court erred in failing to sustain the County's demurrer.View "County of Albemarle v. Camirand" on Justia Law

Adam Ewing submitted a Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) request to the James City County Police Department seeking information and records related to Ewing's arresting officer, Ryan Shelton. The Department issued some, but not all, of the requested documents. Ewing petitioned for a writ of mandamus requiring the production of all the requested documents. The Department found in favor of Ewing and awarded costs and fees. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in ordering the disclosure of personnel records or conduct investigative records, as such records were contained in personnel files and were thus exempted from VFOIA disclosure; (2) the circuit court erred in ordering the identities of all individuals arrested or charged by Shelton or by another officer based on information supplied by Shelton, as the identities of individuals for which Shelton was not the arrested officer were exempt from disclosure; and (3) the issue of attorneys fees was to be remanded to the trial court in light of the holdings in favor of the Department on appeal.View "Harmon v. Ewing" on Justia Law

In 2009, Alexander Nobles pled guilty to driving while intoxicated (DWI) before Judge Thomas Kelley in district court. The case was continued until 2011. At the 2011 hearing, Judge Kelley found Nobles guilty of reckless driving and fined him $250. The Commonwealth objected to Judge Kelley's decision to find Nobles guilty of reckless driving instead of finding him guilty and sentencing him for DWI. Theophani Stamos, the chief deputy Commonwealth's attorney, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling Judge Kelley to sentence Nobles on the charge of DWI. The circuit court issued the writ. Judge Kelley appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court and dismissed the petition, holding that the circuit court erred in issuing the writ ordering Judge Kelley to sentence Nobles on the charge of DWI, as the 2011 order had become final, and Judge Kelley consequently lost jurisdiction to modify the order.View "Kelley v. Stamos" on Justia Law

Orvin Kiser died in 2009 from employment-related exposure to asbestos and his resulting mesothelioma, which was he was diagnosed with in late 2008. In 1988, Kiser was diagnosed with nonmalignant pleural thickening and asbestosis. In 2010, Kiser's wife, Phyllis Kiser, filed a wrongful death action against twenty-one defendants. A U.S. district court dismissed the action as barred by the relevant two-year statute of limitations, holding that Virginia law adheres to the indivisible cause of action theory and limitations begins to run on asbestos-related claims on the initial date of diagnosis by a physician of any asbestos-related disease. On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Virginia Supreme Court. The Court answered that under Va. Code 8.01-249(4), a plaintiff's cause of action for damages due to latent mesothelioma is deemed to accrue not at the time of the mesothelioma diagnosis but, rather, decades earlier, when the plaintiff was diagnosed with an independent, non-malignant asbestos-related disease. View "Kiser v. A.W. Chesterton Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of robbery and use of a firearm. Less than a month after Defendant was released from prison on probation, Defendant was arrested on a new robbery charge. After a revocation hearing, the circuit court found that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, revoked the probation, and entered an order requiring Defendant to serve the remaining eighteen years and four months of his original sentence. After a rehearing, the court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the judgment violated his constitutional right to confront his accusers and the rule against hearsay. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting testimonial hearsay evidence in this probation revocation proceeding, as the evidence comported with the constitutional requirements for admitting the testimonial hearsay evidence and denying Defendant his confrontation rights for "good cause."View "Henderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law