Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent was convicted of aggravated sexual battery. Subsequently, Respondent was determined to be a sexually violent predator and ordered committed to the custody of the Department of Behavioral Health and Development Services. The circuit court later held an annual assessment hearing of Respondent's status that was conducted by two-way electronic video and audio communications pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 37.2-910(A). At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found that Respondent remained a sexually violent predator and ruled that he should remain in secure inpatient treatment. Respondent appealed, arguing because he was not physically present at the hearing his due process and statutory rights were violated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the provision in Code 37.2-910(A) for conducting annual assessment hearings under the Sexually Violent Predator Act by video conference was neither unconstitutional facially nor unconstitutional as applied in Respondent's case; and (2) the circuit court correctly found that Respondent remained a sexually violent predator in need of secure inpatient treatment. View "Shellman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was (1) whether an ordinance authorizing the acquisition of an easement by condemnation also confers the authority to acquire the easement by an action to quiet title, and (2) whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the circuit court's ruling that the City of Virginia Beach proved an implied dedication of the disputed easements and whether the court erred in ruling that Lynnhaven Dunes Condominium Association was not entitled to compensation for its loss of riparian rights. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the authorizing ordinance fully encompassed the City's actions in bringing this condemnation proceeding, and the evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court's ruling that the City had proven it had acquired the easements by implied dedication; but (2) the circuit court erred in ruling that Lynnhaven's loss of riparian rights was non-compensable. View "Lynnhaven Dunes Condo. Ass'n v. City of Virginia Beach" on Justia Law

At issue in this will contest was whether the circuit court erred in instructing the jury as to the existence of the presumption of testamentary capacity. In this case, the decedent bequeathed her dog and a cash gift for the dog's care to Appellant and bequeathed the remainder of her residuary estate to charity. Appellant contended that, under the facts of this case, the presumption disappeared, and it was error to instruct the jury regarding the presumption. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding (1) the presumption of testamentary capacity does not necessary disappear in the face of evidence to the contrary, and moreover, the circuit court did not rule at the motion to strike that the presumption had been rebutted; and (2) therefore, the circuit court did not err in instructing the jury about the presumption. View "Kiddell v. Labowitz" on Justia Law

The Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission filed the present complaint against Jacqueline Waymack, judge of the sixth judicial district, pursuant to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Commission asserted that its charges against Judge Waymack for allegedly violating the Canons of Judicial Conduct were well founded in fact and that the violations were of sufficient gravity to constitute the basis for censure or removal by the Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that there was not clear and convincing evidence that Judge Waymack engaged in either "misconduct" or "conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice" under Va. Const. art. VI, 10. View "Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Waymack" on Justia Law

This appeal from an order dismissing an action for wrongful death presented the question whether the decedent, who was serving on active duty with the armed forces of the United States at the time of his injury, was covered by the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act. If his injury, which was the subject of this action, came within the purview of the Act, an award under the Act would have been his estate's exclusive remedy, barring this action. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the decedent never acquired the right to seek compensation under the Act, and therefore, the circuit court erred in dismissing the action. View "Gibbs v. Newport News Shipbuildng & Drydock Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the circuit court erred when it found that a county subdivision did not violate a restrictive covenant requiring compliance with the county's subdivision ordinance in effect in 1997. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in ruling that the county's 1997 subdivision ordinance did not incorporate the requirements of its 1997 zoning ordinance by implication; but (2) erred when it refused to consider claims that the subdivision violated certain provisions of the 1997 subdivision ordinance not specifically referenced in the amended complaint. View "Fein v. Payandeh" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the circuit court erred when it held that Defendant was not entitled to credit toward his Virginia sentence for the period he was detained in a Virginia jail awaiting trial. At that time, he was a West Virginia prisoner receiving credit toward his West Virginia sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it held Defendant was not entitled to credit toward his Virginia sentence; and (2) the court erred in recharacterizing Defendant's pleading without providing him notice and the opportunity to be heard, but the error was harmless because Defendant was not required to challenge the recharacterization on the appeal, and he was not entitled to credit toward his Virginia sentence. View "Dorr v. Clark" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted in the district court of a felony third offense, DUI after being twice convicted of the same offense within ten years. The circuit court subsequently granted Appellant's motion to dismiss the second DUI case for denial of Appellant's right to a speedy trial. Appellant then filed a petition in the court of appeals for a writ of actual innocence with respect to his felony conviction, contending he was innocent of the felony because one of the requisite predicate misdemeanor convictions had been dismissed with prejudice. A court of appeals panel remanded the case for resentencing on the lesser-included offense of DUI, second conviction. The court of appeals thereafter granted the Commonwealth's petition for a rehearing en banc. The court of appeals, with ten judges sitting en banc, dismissed the writ of actual innocence without opinion by an equally-divided court and withdrew the previous order by the panel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the panel's judgment could only have been withdrawn and thus reversed by a majority of the judges sitting in the court en banc. Remanded with direction to reinstate the judgment of the panel. View "Conley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of three counts of robbery and three counts of use or display of a firearm in committing those felonies. The circuit court ran the firearm sentences consecutively based upon what it interpreted as court of appeals precedent. Appellant appealed, arguing that neither the language of the use or display of a firearm statute, Va. Code Ann. 18.2-53.1, nor the language of the mandatory minimum sentencing statute prohibited the sentences imposed for such firearm charges from being run concurrently with each other. The court of appeals denied Appellant's appeal. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) multiple sentences imposed pursuant to Code 18.2-53.1 may be run concurrently; and (2) to the extent that the holding in Bullock v. Commonwealth was inconsistent with the holding here, that portion of the court of appeals' decision was reversed. Remanded for resentencing. View "Brown v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-308.2(A). Defendant appealed, arguing that he should have been convicted of only one continuous possession. The court of appeals upheld all three possession convictions, holding that each of the convictions was based on "distinguishable incidents." At issue on appeal was whether evidence of the possession of one firearm on three separate occasions can constitute three separate charges for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the incidents at issue constituted distinct acts or occurrences, each reflecting an enhanced danger to the public, and convictions for the three separate charges on the facts of this case were therefore valid under Code 18.2-308.2(A). View "Baker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law