Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n
In this appeal, Appalachian Power Company (APCO) sought rate adjustment clause recovery of $33.3 million in environmental compliance costs that the State Corporation Commission denied. The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded, holding (1) APCO was entitled to a rate adjustment clause for recovery of actual costs it directly incurred for environmental compliance in 2009 and 2010 but did not recover through its base rates, and the portion of the Commission's decision denying recovery of environmental compliance costs on the basis that those costs were connected with projects included in APCO's base rates which APCO had the opportunity to recover was reversed; and (2) the portion of the Commission's decision denying APCO recovery of environmental compliance costs alleged to be embedded in the capacity equalization charges APCO paid to its affiliates in 2009 and 2010 was affirmed. Remanded. View "Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law
3232 Page Ave. Condo. Ass’n v. City of Virginia Beach
In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether a condemnor may, in an eminent domain proceeding, alternatively assert ownership rights in the condemned property. The Court further considered whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the circuit court's ruling that the City of Virginia Beach proved an implied dedication of the disputed property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by allowing the City to condemn property that it also claimed to own; and (2) the evidence demonstrated that the City acquired the easements through an implied dedication based on the continued public use and the City's efforts in maintaining and patrolling the property. View "3232 Page Ave. Condo. Ass'n v. City of Virginia Beach" on Justia Law
Va. Polytechnic Inst. v. Prosper Fin., Inc.
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (VPI) and Prosper Financial (Prosper) entered into a research contract. The contract provided two addresses in Florida for Prosper. VPI subsequently filed a complaint in Virginia for breach of contract. VPI attempted to secure service of process on Prosper through the Secretary of the Commonwealth. In its affidavit for service of process on the Secretary, VPI listed the address contained in the contract's notice provision as Prosper's last known address. After Prosper failed to file responsive pleadings, the trial court entered a default judgment against Prosper. Upon Prosper's motion, the trial court determined the order of default judgment should be set aside because service of process should have been attempted at both Florida addresses. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the final judgment against Prosper, holding (1) the use of one of the two Prosper addresses known to VPI was constitutional and satisfied the requirements of Va. Code Ann. 8.01-329(B), and therefore, the trial court's determination that both addresses were required was error; and (2) the trial court erred in setting aside the order of default judgment brought pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-428(D) without identifying its findings on the necessary elements of the action. View "Va. Polytechnic Inst. v. Prosper Fin., Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Contracts, Virginia Supreme Court
Tuttle v. Webb
Lloyd Tuttle Jr. appealed the circuit court's judgment holding that execution of a check payable to his wife, Grace Tuttle, excluded the funds from Grace's augmented estate and that therefore Lloyd's written consent or joinder was not required when Grace, before her death, gifted the funds to her son. Lloyd also appealed the circuit court's judgment holding him liable for more than one-half of an indebtedness evidenced by a note executed by him and Grace as co-makers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Lloyd's check to Grace did not exclude those funds from Grace's augmented estate, and therefore, the circuit court erred by failing to include the funds in Grace's augmented estate; and (2) the circuit court erred by requiring Lloyd to pay more than one-half of the total joint indebtedness, as Lloyd was liable for only one-half of the indebtedness. View "Tuttle v. Webb" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Trusts & Estates, Virginia Supreme Court
Preferred Sys. Solutions, Inc. v. GP Consulting, LLC
These companion appeals arose out of a dispute between a government contractor, Preferred Systems Solutions, Inc. (PSS) and one of its subcontractors, GP Consulting, LLC (GP). PSS sued GP following GP's termination of its contract with PSS and its commencement of a subsequent contract with a PSS competitor. PSS alleged breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and tortious interference with contract, seeking injunctive as well as monetary relief. PSS was ultimately awarded $172,396 in compensatory damages based on the circuit court's finding that GP breached the noncompete clause in the parties' contract. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) awarding damages to PSS for lost profits as a result of GP's breach of the noncompete clause; and (2) refusing to grant PSS injunctive relief, in concluding that PSS failed to prove tortious interference, and in dismissing PSS' trade secret claim. View "Preferred Sys. Solutions, Inc. v. GP Consulting, LLC" on Justia Law
Omega Protein, Inc. v. Forrest
In this personal injury action, Plaintiff sued Employer under the Jones Act for an injury to his back sustained in the course of his employment with Employer as a crew member aboard a commercial fishing vessel. Plaintiff's ultimate negligence liability theory at trial was that Employer breached its duty of care by not obtaining an MRI as part of his pre-employment physical. The trial court awarded damages to Plaintiff upon a jury verdict. The Supreme Court reversed and entered final judgment in favor of Employer, holding that, as a matter of law, there was no evidence of causation presented in the trial of Plaintiff's negligence claim against Employer under the Jones Act. View "Omega Protein, Inc. v. Forrest" on Justia Law
McKinney v. Va. Surgical Assocs., P.C.
Plaintiff in this case was the widow of the Decedent, and Defendant was Virginia Surgical Associates. After discovery, Plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit of her wrongful death action. Later, Plaintiff filed in the same court, against the same defendant, the present action for personal injuries suffered by Decedent arising out of the same alleged negligence, as a survival action. The survival action was filed more than two years after Defendant's alleged negligence but less than six months after Plaintiff's nonsuit of her action for wrongful death. The circuit court sustained Defendant's plea in bar based on the two-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for personal injury and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in holding that the survival action was a different cause of action than the wrongful death action and it was therefore not saved by the tolling provision of Va. Code Ann. 8.01-229(E)(3). Remanded. View "McKinney v. Va. Surgical Assocs., P.C." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Injury Law, Virginia Supreme Court
Manchester Oaks Homeowners Ass’n v. Batt
Plaintiffs, owners of garaged lots in a subdivision, filed a complaint against the homeowners' association (HOA) alleging that the unequal treatment resulting from the HOA's assignment of parking spaces only to ungaraged lots in an amendment violated the subdivision's declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (the Declaration). The circuit court determined that the amendment was invalid and ruled that the reservation of parking spaces in the common area for use solely by owners of ungaraged lots violated the Declaration. The court also found Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in ruling the Declaration requires that parking spaces in the common area be assigned equally among all lot owners; (2) did not err in ruling that the amendment was invalid; (3) erred in its award of certain compensatory damages but did not err in awarding other compensatory damages; and (4) did not err in ruling that Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees and in determining the amount of that award. Remanded for a determination of attorneys' fees incurred by Plaintiffs subsequent to the court's entry of the judgment appealed from. View "Manchester Oaks Homeowners Ass'n v. Batt" on Justia Law
Kurpiel v. Hicks
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging common law trespass. Plaintiffs argued that by not developing their land in a reasonable manner, Defendants directed and caused storm water to flow upon Plaintiffs' property so as to cause damage to the property. The trial court sustained Defendants' demurrer with prejudice, finding that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action for trespass. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in sustaining Defendants' demurrer, as Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action for common law trespass based upon a violation of the modified common law rule applicable to surface water. Remanded. View "Kurpiel v. Hicks" on Justia Law
Johnson v. Anis
Defendant entered an Alford plea of guilty to an indictment charging him with grand larceny. Before the sentencing order became final, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court ultimately denied the motion. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus, claiming that he had been denied he effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel had failed to base his motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the specific grounds of mistake, fear, misunderstanding, and misrepresentation. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court granted Defendant the writ. In granting the writ, the court relied on Justus v. Commonwealth. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the writ, holding (1) the circuit court applied an inapplicable standard in granting the writ, and (2) there was no evidence to support a conclusion that Defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel or that manifest injustice occurred. View "Johnson v. Anis" on Justia Law