Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Clerk of the Circuit Court of the City of Fredericksburg, filed a putative class action in the federal district court against the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), alleging that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had failed to pay recordation taxes imposed by Code §§ 58.1-801 and -802. The federal court certified to the Virginia Supreme Court two questions: Under Virginia law, does a clerk of court possess statutory standing to initiate a lawsuit, in his official capacity, to enforce the real estate transfer tax; If a clerk of court does possess such authority, does Virginia law authorize him to do so as a class representative on behalf of all clerks of court throughout the Commonwealth? The court answered the first question “no” and did not address the second. The court characterized the clerk’s duties as ministerial and noted the statutory scheme for enforcement of the transfer tax. View "Small v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth's attorney for the City of Portsmouth informed Plaintiff, who hosted Texas Hold 'Em poker games and tournaments, that, to avoid prosecution, Plaintiff must cease and desist "all forms of illegal gambling." Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the game of Texas Hold 'Em constitutes illegal gambling under Va. Code Ann. 18.2-325 and whether Va. Code Ann. 18.2-328 was facially unconstitutional and should be found void for vagueness. The circuit court ruled against Plaintiff. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the judgment to the extent the circuit court ruled that Plaintiff failed to establish that Texas Hold 'Em was not illegal gambling under section 18.2-325, as the claim did not present a justiciable controversy, and the circuit court did not have the authority to exercise jurisdiction concerning such a claim; and (2) affirmed the court's judgment to the extent the court ruled that section 18.2-328 was not unconstitutional.View "Daniels v. Mobley" on Justia Law

Jack Bays, Inc. did site work on the construction of a new church (New Life). Jack Bays contracted with several subcontractors, eleven of which were parties to this action. New Life obtained additional funds for the project through three lenders. The Lenders were listed on the deed of trust for the new financing. After New Life stopped making to Jack Bays due to lack of funding, Jack Bays recorded its memorandum of mechanics' lien against New Life and terminated the construction contract. All Contractors timely filed complaints against the Lenders. The circuit court ordered that the property be sold at public auction with the proceeds to be applied in satisfaction of the mechanics' liens in the following order of priority: Subcontractors, Jack Bays, and Lenders. The Lenders appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in finding that Jack Bays' lien was valid; (2) was not plainly wrong in determining that the Contractors' liens had priority over the Lenders' deed of trust; but (3) erred in approving the sale of the entire parcel of land to satisfy the Contractors' liens, where no evidence was introduced to support this decision. Remanded.View "Glasser & Glasser, PLC v. Jack Bays, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, the City Council revoked a blanket special exception permitting two business establishments (the Establishments) operating in the City to operate as "entertainment establishments" serving alcoholic beverages for on-site consumption and denied their individual applications for special exceptions to continue such operations. The City later filed a complaint requesting that the Establishments be permanently enjoined from selling or serving alcohol or providing entertainment in their businesses. The Establishments filed a separate complaint and petition for appeal, asserting that the City Council's actions impaired their vested rights and that the manner in which the Council executed these actions violated their statutory notice and due process rights. The circuit court denied the relief requested by the Establishments and granted the City's request for injunctive relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Establishments did not acquire any vested rights under Va. Code 15.2-2307 or Va. Code 15.2-2311(C); and (2) because the Establishments had actual notice of and actively participated in the City Council meeting, any statutory notice issues were waived and their constitutional rights were not violated.View "Norfolk 102, LLC v. City of Norfolk" on Justia Law

Carolyn Osman had three sons, all of whom were the beneficiaries of Carolyn's estate and various trusts. Carolyn died in 2009 as a result of her son Michael's actions. Her cause of death was strangulation and blunt force trauma to the head. Michael was found not guilty of first-degree murder for reason of insanity. The executors of Carolyn's estate and co-trustees of the trusts subsequently filed a request for declaratory judgment in the circuit court asking the court to declare that Michael was a "slayer" under Va. Code 55-401. The circuit court found that although Michael was found not guilty by reason of insanity, he was a slayer under section 55-401 and could not share in the proceeds from his mother's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in holding that Michael was a slayer under section 55-401, and that as a result, Michael could not inherit his share of his mother's estate.View "Osman v. Osman" on Justia Law

Shearin Construction, Inc., acting through its agent, Jeffrey Tharpe, contracted with the United States government to perform excavation work at Fort Pickett. Shearin subsequently contracted with the Southside Regional Service Authority (Authority) to perform excavation work at another site. A dispute arose between the Authority and Shearin, after which J. Harman Saunders, the owner of Saunders Construction, told the Authority's executive director that "Tharpe told me that Tharpe was going to screw the Authority like he did Fort Pickett." This statement was repeated and republished by and to the Authority and the news media. Tharpe and Shearin (Plaintiffs) filed this defamation suit against Saunders and Saunders Construction (Defendants). Defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that the statement allegedly made by Saunders did not contain a provably false statement but was an expression of opinion. The circuit court sustained the demurrer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling the alleged defamatory statement was an expression of opinion and in sustaining the demurrer on that ground. Remanded.View "Tharpe v. Saunders" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned an underlying criminal case against Lillian Callender and Michael Stoffa. Following bench trials, Callender and Stoffa were found guilty of felony neglect and second-degree murder. Prior to Callender's sentencing and Stoffa's trial, Daily Press requested permission to review the file related to Callender's trial. The clerk of the circuit court denied the request, and the circuit court entered an order sealing the entire Callender file from public inspection until the conclusion of Callender's and Stoffa's cases. The circuit court later rescinded the order and allowed the attorneys for Callender and the Commonwealth to withdraw the original exhibits from the Callender file to be used in Stoffa's trial. Daily Press requested that photocopies of the withdrawn exhibits remain in the public file, but the court directed that photocopies of the original exhibits be placed in the file under seal. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court, holding that the order violated the public's constitutional and statutory right of access to criminal proceedings. View "Daily Press, Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A real estate developer (Developer), purchased property contained within a proposed sudivision. The County issued to Developer a total of fifty-two building permits, for which Developer paid a proffer fee of $12,000, which was $4,000 more than Developer expected to pay. In 2007, Developer filed an action asking the trial court to declare that the County could not lawfully assess the $4,000 fee. In 2011, after the fee had been paid on all fifty-two permits, the court found that the $4,000 fee was unlawful. In 2008, Developer instituted a restitution action seeking reimbursement of the fees. The trial court consolidated this restitution action and the declaratory judgment action for a bench trial. After ruling in Developer's favor in the declaratory judgment action, the court ruled in the restitution action that Developer was barred from being awarded reimbursement of the unlawful fees because it paid them "voluntarily" within the meaning of the voluntary payment doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in holding that Developer's action for reimbursement of the disputed fees was barred under the voluntary payment doctrine.View "D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

The Albemarle County Board of Supervisors disallowed payment on a portion of retirement benefits promised to several retired Albemarle County employees (collectively, Retirees). The benefits promised under the County's Voluntary Early Retirement Incentive Program (VERIP) were partially disallowed due to a miscalculation by a County employee prior to the retirements. The Retirees appealed. The County and Board (hereafter, the County) demurred, arguing that the Retirees failed to comply with Va. Code 15.2-1246 by not serving written notice of their appeal on the clerk of the Board. The circuit court overruled the demurrer and found in favor of Plaintiffs, awarding each of the Retirees the amount of the withheld VERIP stipend that the County claimed would amount to an overpayment if properly calculated under the program. The Supreme Court reversed and entered final judgment in favor of the County, holding that the statutorily required written notice of appeal was insufficient, and accordingly, the circuit court erred in failing to sustain the County's demurrer.View "County of Albemarle v. Camirand" on Justia Law

Adam Ewing submitted a Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) request to the James City County Police Department seeking information and records related to Ewing's arresting officer, Ryan Shelton. The Department issued some, but not all, of the requested documents. Ewing petitioned for a writ of mandamus requiring the production of all the requested documents. The Department found in favor of Ewing and awarded costs and fees. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in ordering the disclosure of personnel records or conduct investigative records, as such records were contained in personnel files and were thus exempted from VFOIA disclosure; (2) the circuit court erred in ordering the identities of all individuals arrested or charged by Shelton or by another officer based on information supplied by Shelton, as the identities of individuals for which Shelton was not the arrested officer were exempt from disclosure; and (3) the issue of attorneys fees was to be remanded to the trial court in light of the holdings in favor of the Department on appeal.View "Harmon v. Ewing" on Justia Law