Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Alexander Nobles pled guilty to driving while intoxicated (DWI) before Judge Thomas Kelley in district court. The case was continued until 2011. At the 2011 hearing, Judge Kelley found Nobles guilty of reckless driving and fined him $250. The Commonwealth objected to Judge Kelley's decision to find Nobles guilty of reckless driving instead of finding him guilty and sentencing him for DWI. Theophani Stamos, the chief deputy Commonwealth's attorney, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling Judge Kelley to sentence Nobles on the charge of DWI. The circuit court issued the writ. Judge Kelley appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court and dismissed the petition, holding that the circuit court erred in issuing the writ ordering Judge Kelley to sentence Nobles on the charge of DWI, as the 2011 order had become final, and Judge Kelley consequently lost jurisdiction to modify the order.View "Kelley v. Stamos" on Justia Law

Orvin Kiser died in 2009 from employment-related exposure to asbestos and his resulting mesothelioma, which was he was diagnosed with in late 2008. In 1988, Kiser was diagnosed with nonmalignant pleural thickening and asbestosis. In 2010, Kiser's wife, Phyllis Kiser, filed a wrongful death action against twenty-one defendants. A U.S. district court dismissed the action as barred by the relevant two-year statute of limitations, holding that Virginia law adheres to the indivisible cause of action theory and limitations begins to run on asbestos-related claims on the initial date of diagnosis by a physician of any asbestos-related disease. On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Virginia Supreme Court. The Court answered that under Va. Code 8.01-249(4), a plaintiff's cause of action for damages due to latent mesothelioma is deemed to accrue not at the time of the mesothelioma diagnosis but, rather, decades earlier, when the plaintiff was diagnosed with an independent, non-malignant asbestos-related disease. View "Kiser v. A.W. Chesterton Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of robbery and use of a firearm. Less than a month after Defendant was released from prison on probation, Defendant was arrested on a new robbery charge. After a revocation hearing, the circuit court found that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, revoked the probation, and entered an order requiring Defendant to serve the remaining eighteen years and four months of his original sentence. After a rehearing, the court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the judgment violated his constitutional right to confront his accusers and the rule against hearsay. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting testimonial hearsay evidence in this probation revocation proceeding, as the evidence comported with the constitutional requirements for admitting the testimonial hearsay evidence and denying Defendant his confrontation rights for "good cause."View "Henderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Alison Dressner was issued a summons for possession of marijuana. The Commonwealth amended the charge to possession of marijuana. Dressner was then arraigned on the amended charge, and entered a guilty plea to that charge. Dressner subsequently filed a petition for expungement of police and court records pertaining to the possession of marijuana charge. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in concluding that expungement of the possession of marijuana charge would distort the record, as the possession of marijuana charge was necessarily "otherwise dismissed"; and (2) Dressner satisfied the requirements of the expungement statute, where she demonstrated the existence of manifest injustice with the continued existence of information relating to the marijuana charge, and was entitled to have the police and court records relating to the marijuana charge expunged.View "Dressner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Employee filed a complaint against Corporation seeking damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and wrongful termination. Previous to the suit, Corporation offered Employee a severance package that Employee rejected because it would have taken away any rights to a claim for a change in control. A jury found for Employee on all counts except for wrongful termination. The trial court awarded damages and attorney's fees to Employee. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding the circuit court did not err when it (1) refused to hold, as a matter of law, that Employee failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a change in control occurred; (2) instructed the jury to construe any ambiguities in the contracts against the drafter; (3) submitted Employee's alternative theory of mandatory severance benefits to the jury; (4) submitted Employee's claim for unjust enrichment to the jury; (5) admitted the testimony of Employee's damages expert; and (6) awarded Employee attorneys' fees and expenses for breach of the severance agreement. However, the trial court erred in determining that the severance agreement entitled Employee to recover his legal fees for claims that were not related to breach of the severance agreement. View "Online Res. Corp. v. Lawlor" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on and convicted of one count of capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape, and one count of capital murder in the commission of abduction with the intent to defile. The sentencing court imposed two sentences of death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not commit prejudicial error in (a) limiting questioning during voir dire, (b) excluding evidence during the penalty phase of trial, and (c) instructing the jury; (2) the evidence was sufficient to prove the elements of the offenses charged and the aggravating factors required for imposition of a sentence of death; (3) the imposition of the death penalty was constitutional and met the relevant statutory factors; and (4) the sentences of death were not imposed under mistake and were not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. View "Lawlor v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Child was conceived in vitro using Father's sperm and Mother's egg. After Child was born, Father voluntarily signed an acknowledgment of paternity jointly with Mother pursuant to Va. Code 20-49.1(B)(2). The couple later separated, and Father filed a petition to determine parentage and establish custody and visitation, arguing that the acknowledgment of paternity created a final and binding parent-child legal status between Father and Child. Mother filed pleas in bar asserting that Father was barred from being Child's legal parent because he and Mother were never married and Child was conceived through assisted conception. The circuit court sustained the pleas in bar and dismissed the remainder of Father's petition seeking custody and visitation. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the assisted conception statute does not operate to divest individuals of the ability to establish parentage solely due to marital status under the circumstances presented in this case; (2) the assisted conception statute does not violate equal protection but, if not harmonized with another statute to allow unmarried fathers parentage of their children, would violate constitutional rights to due process; and (3) acknowledgments of paternity executed pursuant to section 20-49.1(B)(2) are enforceable. View "L.F. v. Breit" on Justia Law

Steven Funkhouser's three-year-old twins were playing in their parents' 2001 Ford Windstar when a fire erupted in the passenger compartment of the van. One of the twins died as a result of third-degree burns she received. Funkhouser, as administrator of his daughter's estate, brought a products liability action against For Motor Company and Obaugh Ford (collectively, Ford). Funkhouser sought to introduce evidence of seven other Ford Windstar fires that occurred prior to the Funkhouser fire that were parked and not in operation. The court excluded the evidence and ruled that Funkhouser's expert witnesses could not rely on the excluded evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because none of the seven prior fires were the same or substantially similar to the Funkhouser fire, the evidence was properly excluded for failing the substantial similarity test; and (2) an expert cannot offer opinion testimony based on evidence that fails the substantial similarity test, and accordingly, the trial court did not err in precluding Funkhouser's experts from relying on the evidence of the seven other Windstar fires as a basis for their opinions. View "Funkhouser v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

James Lokey passed away due to complications related to mesothelioma. Lokey had served as a state trooper, where his duties included observing vehicle inspections wherein mechanics used compressed air to blow out brake debris to allow for visual inspection of the brakes. Walter Boomer, the administrator of Lokey's estate, filed wrongful death actions against Honeywell International, Inc., the successor-in-interest to Bendix, and Ford Motor Company, alleging that Lokey's mesothelioma was a result of exposure to asbestos in dust from Bendix brakes installed in Ford and other vehicles. After a jury trial, the trial court found in favor of the estate as to negligence and awarded damages in the amount of $282,685. Ford and Honeywell appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to causation; and (2) there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Defendants' failure to warn was the proximate cause of Lokey's mesothelioma. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer" on Justia Law

Rubert Minton suffered injuries as a result of developing mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos while working on Exxon Mobile Corporation (Exxon) ships during his employment at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company (Shipyard). Minton filed suit against Exxon under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for failure to warn Minton of, and protect him from, the dangers associated with asbestos. The jury found in favor of Minton and awarded him compensatory damages, medical expenses, and punitive damages. Exxon appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court erred in refusing to admit relevant evidence regarding the Shipyard's knowledge of the danger of asbestos exposure and its ability to remedy the danger; and (2) the award of $12,500,000 in punitive damages was inappropriately granted because punitive damages are a remedy prohibited by the terms of LHWCA. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Minton" on Justia Law