Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lloyd Tuttle Jr. appealed the circuit court's judgment holding that execution of a check payable to his wife, Grace Tuttle, excluded the funds from Grace's augmented estate and that therefore Lloyd's written consent or joinder was not required when Grace, before her death, gifted the funds to her son. Lloyd also appealed the circuit court's judgment holding him liable for more than one-half of an indebtedness evidenced by a note executed by him and Grace as co-makers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Lloyd's check to Grace did not exclude those funds from Grace's augmented estate, and therefore, the circuit court erred by failing to include the funds in Grace's augmented estate; and (2) the circuit court erred by requiring Lloyd to pay more than one-half of the total joint indebtedness, as Lloyd was liable for only one-half of the indebtedness. View "Tuttle v. Webb" on Justia Law

These companion appeals arose out of a dispute between a government contractor, Preferred Systems Solutions, Inc. (PSS) and one of its subcontractors, GP Consulting, LLC (GP). PSS sued GP following GP's termination of its contract with PSS and its commencement of a subsequent contract with a PSS competitor. PSS alleged breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and tortious interference with contract, seeking injunctive as well as monetary relief. PSS was ultimately awarded $172,396 in compensatory damages based on the circuit court's finding that GP breached the noncompete clause in the parties' contract. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) awarding damages to PSS for lost profits as a result of GP's breach of the noncompete clause; and (2) refusing to grant PSS injunctive relief, in concluding that PSS failed to prove tortious interference, and in dismissing PSS' trade secret claim. View "Preferred Sys. Solutions, Inc. v. GP Consulting, LLC" on Justia Law

In this personal injury action, Plaintiff sued Employer under the Jones Act for an injury to his back sustained in the course of his employment with Employer as a crew member aboard a commercial fishing vessel. Plaintiff's ultimate negligence liability theory at trial was that Employer breached its duty of care by not obtaining an MRI as part of his pre-employment physical. The trial court awarded damages to Plaintiff upon a jury verdict. The Supreme Court reversed and entered final judgment in favor of Employer, holding that, as a matter of law, there was no evidence of causation presented in the trial of Plaintiff's negligence claim against Employer under the Jones Act. View "Omega Protein, Inc. v. Forrest" on Justia Law

Plaintiff in this case was the widow of the Decedent, and Defendant was Virginia Surgical Associates. After discovery, Plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit of her wrongful death action. Later, Plaintiff filed in the same court, against the same defendant, the present action for personal injuries suffered by Decedent arising out of the same alleged negligence, as a survival action. The survival action was filed more than two years after Defendant's alleged negligence but less than six months after Plaintiff's nonsuit of her action for wrongful death. The circuit court sustained Defendant's plea in bar based on the two-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for personal injury and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in holding that the survival action was a different cause of action than the wrongful death action and it was therefore not saved by the tolling provision of Va. Code Ann. 8.01-229(E)(3). Remanded. View "McKinney v. Va. Surgical Assocs., P.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, owners of garaged lots in a subdivision, filed a complaint against the homeowners' association (HOA) alleging that the unequal treatment resulting from the HOA's assignment of parking spaces only to ungaraged lots in an amendment violated the subdivision's declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (the Declaration). The circuit court determined that the amendment was invalid and ruled that the reservation of parking spaces in the common area for use solely by owners of ungaraged lots violated the Declaration. The court also found Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in ruling the Declaration requires that parking spaces in the common area be assigned equally among all lot owners; (2) did not err in ruling that the amendment was invalid; (3) erred in its award of certain compensatory damages but did not err in awarding other compensatory damages; and (4) did not err in ruling that Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees and in determining the amount of that award. Remanded for a determination of attorneys' fees incurred by Plaintiffs subsequent to the court's entry of the judgment appealed from. View "Manchester Oaks Homeowners Ass'n v. Batt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging common law trespass. Plaintiffs argued that by not developing their land in a reasonable manner, Defendants directed and caused storm water to flow upon Plaintiffs' property so as to cause damage to the property. The trial court sustained Defendants' demurrer with prejudice, finding that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action for trespass. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in sustaining Defendants' demurrer, as Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action for common law trespass based upon a violation of the modified common law rule applicable to surface water. Remanded. View "Kurpiel v. Hicks" on Justia Law

Defendant entered an Alford plea of guilty to an indictment charging him with grand larceny. Before the sentencing order became final, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court ultimately denied the motion. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus, claiming that he had been denied he effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel had failed to base his motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the specific grounds of mistake, fear, misunderstanding, and misrepresentation. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court granted Defendant the writ. In granting the writ, the court relied on Justus v. Commonwealth. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the writ, holding (1) the circuit court applied an inapplicable standard in granting the writ, and (2) there was no evidence to support a conclusion that Defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel or that manifest injustice occurred. View "Johnson v. Anis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Decedent's wife and estate, filed suit under general maritime law against John Crane, Inc. (JCI) seeking compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that Decedent, a former seaman, was exposed to asbestos contained in products manufactured by JCI and that he contracted mesothelioma as a result of such exposure. Plaintiffs' third amended complaint included revived personal injury survival claims - which sought damages for Decedent's pre-death pain and suffering - and Plaintiffs' wrongful death claims. A jury awarded $2 million in damages for Decedent's pre-death pain and suffering. The Supreme Court vacated the award. Plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing, which the Court granted. The Court then reinstated the award and modified its opinion, holding that because the Jones Act permits recovery for the losses suffered during a decedent seaman's lifetime in a survival action, including pre-death pain and suffering, Decedent's estate may recover for his pre-death pain and suffering under general maritime law. View "John Crane, Inc. v. Hardick" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the circuit court erred in allowing Plaintiff to take a nonsuit as a matter of right pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-380(B) based on its determination that Plaintiff's prior voluntary dismissal in federal court was not a nonsuit under section 8.01-380. In Virginia, a plaintiff may take only one nonsuit as a matter of right. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in finding that Plaintiff was permitted to take a nonsuit as a matter of right pursuant to section 8.01-380(B), holding (1) Va. Code Ann. 8.01-229(E)(3) does not confirm or suggest that a voluntary dismissal taken pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) is a nonsuit for purposes of section 8.01-380; and (2) Plaintiff's prior voluntary dismissal in federal court was not substantially equivalent to Virginia's nonsuit in this regard. View "Inova Health Care Servs. v. Kebaish" on Justia Law

Seaman filed this action to recover maintenance and cure and compensatory and punitive damages from his former employer (Employer), claiming that he suffered PTSD and depression as a result of being gang-raped by uniformed Korean police officers while he was on shore leave from Employer's ship docked in Korea. The jury awarded Seaman $20,000,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages. The circuit court granted Employer's motion for partial summary judgment precluding Seaman's denial of maintenance and cure, set aside the punitive damages award, and remitted the compensatory damages award to $2,000,000. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on all issues relating to the seaworthiness and Jones Act claims regarding Employer's actions after Seaman returned to the ship, and Seaman's claim for maintenance and cure benefits, holding (1) the circuit court erred by not ordering a new trial after concluding that the maintenance and cure claim for compensatory and punitive damages should not have been submitted to the jury; and (2) the circuit court erred in refusing the instruction proffered by Employer quoting the circuit court's pre-trial ruling on the Jones Act and seaworthiness claims, and the refusal was not harmless. View "Hale v. Maersk Line Ltd." on Justia Law