Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John Rives was arrested for using profane, threatening, or indecent language over public airways, a misdemeanor. Convicted in the general district court, Rives appealed to the circuit court where he was again convicted. The court of appeals affirmed after applying the Miller v. California test for the definition of obscenity and finding that the phone calls made by Rives' met the Miller test for obscenity because the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to conclude that Rives' language had as its dominant theme an appeal to the prurient interest in sex and was therefore obscene within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed but for a slightly different reason, holding (1) the question of whether language used in telephonic communications is obscene is immaterial in cases involving threats to commit illegal or immoral acts, where the threat is made with the intent to coerce, intimidate or harass any person; and (2) Rives' language was clearly sufficient to enable a rational fact-finder to conclude that he was threatening the complainant with physical injury in the form of a sexual offense, with the obvious intent to intimidate and harass her. View "Rives v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Fred and Mary Ann Hart filed a complaint against Piney Meeting House Investments (PMH), alleging that PMH placed various obstructions in the Harts' easement area on PMH's property that interfered with the Harts' full use and enjoyment of the easement. A commissioner in chancery enjoined PMH from maintaining several encroachments but found that a well and a propane tank could remain underground. The Harts filed exceptions to the commissioner's report and argued that they were entitled to their attorney's fees. The circuit court sustained the Harts' exceptions and found that the Harts were entitled to recover their attorney's fees and costs from PMH. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court insofar as it sustained the Harts' exceptions regarding the buried propane tank and well; (2) affirmed the circuit court in its award of costs to the Harts; and (3) reversed the circuit court in its award of attorney's fees to the Harts. Remanded. View "Piney Meeting House Invs., Inc. v. Hart" on Justia Law

MT Technology Enterprises, LLC filed an amended complaint against Cristol, LLC, several members of Cristol's board of managers, and an employee of Cristol, Cristol's attorney, and the attorney's firm, alleging, inter alia, statutory conspiracy, tortious interference with economic expectancy in MT technologies, and breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The trial court imposed sanctions against Cristol, its board, and its employee (Defendants) for discovery violations. The case proceeded to a jury against Defendants, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of MT. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err in its interpretation of Va. Code Ann. 13.1-1057(A) and in concluding that MT satisfied the registration requirements of the statute; (2) the trial court did not err in imposing a sanction for discovery abuses; but (3) the trial court abused its discretion by forbidding cross-examination of witnesses regarding damages. Remanded for further proceedings on damages only. View "Nolte v. MT Tech. Enters., LLC" on Justia Law

Kesha Napper, one of Kastle Systems' employees, slipped during work hours in the lobby of the building owned by Kastle. Napper filed suit alleging negligence against the janitorial services companies who cleaned the building and the property management company (Defendants). Defendants filed a plea in bar, arguing that because Napper had been receiving workers' compensation benefits in connection with her injury, Napper's claims were barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. The trial court sustained Defendants' plea in bar and dismissed Napper's complaint with prejudice, finding that Napper and Defendants were statutory co-employees for purposes of the workers' compensation scheme. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in sustaining Defendants' plea in bar because Napper's action against Defendants was not barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity provision in the Act, as, (1) under Floyd v. Mitchell, Defendants were other parties as contemplated by the Act and strangers to Kastle's particular business of operating a call center; and (2) thus, Defendants and Napper were not statutory fellow employees. Remanded. View "Napper v. ABM Janitorial Servs." on Justia Law

The Jared and Donna Murayama 1997 Trust sought damages arising from a settlement agreement between the Trust, its trustee Jared Murayama, and two of the defendants, NISC Holdings, LLC and Omen LLC, which transaction included NISC's repurchase of the Trust's voting stock in NISC (the "settlement agreement"). The Trust claimed it was damaged from selling the stock to NISC for substantially less than its fair market value as a result of the Trust's reliance on fraudulent omissions and misrepresentations of Defendants. The circuit court found that the Trust's allegations established that, as a matter of law, the Trust did not reasonably rely upon Defendants' alleged fraudulent omissions and misrepresentations regarding the value of the NISC stock at the time of the settlement. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment sustaining Defendants' demurrer, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment based upon both the language of the settlement agreement and the allegations regarding the adversarial relationship between Murayama and the defendants that precipitated the settlement. View "Murayama 1997 Trust v. NISC Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

After his employment was terminated at Horizon House, Michael Ford filed a complaint against the three corporate employers vested with the authority to fire him, including the Horizon House homeowners association. James Mansfield served as counsel to Horizon House. Ford sent a demand letter and a draft complaint marked "for settlement purposes only" to numerous individuals and entities. Ford then filed a complaint, substantially similar to the draft complaint, in the U.S. district court against several defendants, including Mansfield. Mansfield subsequently filed a complaint against Ford and others (Defendants), alleging that he was defamed by statements made about him in the draft complaint. The circuit court sustained Defendants' demurrers, ruling that the allegations made in the draft complaint, sent before the lawsuit was filed, were privileged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that absolute privilege attached to the draft complaint. View "Mansfield v. Bernabei" on Justia Law

Geoff Livingston and 134 other homeonwers or renters (collectively Plaintiffs) in a Fairfax County subdivision brought an inverse condemnation suit against the County and the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) after their homes were flooded during a severe storm. The circuit court dismissed the suit on demurrer, holding that a single occurrence of flooding could not support an inverse condemnation claim under Va. Const. art. I, 11. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint, if taken as true, established that their homes and personal property were damaged by VDOT's operation of, and failure to maintain, the relocation of a tributary stream, the circuit court erred in dismissing their inverse condemnation suit on VDOT's demurrer. Remanded. View "Livingston v. Va. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Employee suffered an injury during the course of his employment. Employer agreed to voluntarily pay workers' compensation benefits, and the Workers Compensation Commission issued an award order approving the agreements between Employee and Employer. Employer then filed an application with the Commission seeking to suspend Employee's benefits under the order for unjustifiably refusing to participate in vocational rehabilitation. The Commission denied the application. The court of appeals reversed. At issue on appeal was whether Employee should be permitted to offer evidence that his refusal to accept vocational rehabilitation services was justified because of a disabling injury that arose out of the same industrial accident for which he was awarded benefits, but which was not expressly designated in the award as a compensable injury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in determining that Employee was precluded from asserting that his refusal of vocational rehabilitation was justified. Remanded for an evidentiary proceeding so Employee could show his refusal was justified in light of his disabling injury. View "Ilg v. United Parcel Serv." on Justia Law

Scott and Martha Giordano were married and later separated. Scott was subsequently killed while working as an insulator in a building. Martha filed a claim for benefits with the Workers' Compensation Commission. The deputy commissioner determined that Martha was not a dependent of Scott and, therefore, was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Subsequently, Martha, as personal representative Scott's estate, filed a wrongful death claim against Defendants, Scott's employer, the employer's subcontractors, and a supplier of a product used in the construction process (Builder's Supply). The circuit court sustained Defendants' pleas in bar, concluding that the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act barred Martha's action. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in holding that the exclusivity provision barred a non-dependent individual who was not eligible to collect benefits under the Act from bringing an action in tort; but (2) the court erred in holding that this provision of the Act barred an action in tort against Builder's Supply, as mere delivery of product was not within the trade, business or occupation of Scott's employer. View "Giordano v. McBar Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Steven Funkhouser, administrator of the estate of Emily Funkhouser, brought this products liability action against Ford Motor Company and Obaugh Ford, Inc. (collectively "Ford") after his daughter, Emily, died from severe burns she suffered when the family's Ford Windstar minivan caught fire. The circuit court ruled that evidence of seven other Winstar van fires was inadmissible. The parties then entered into an agreed final order wherein Funkhouser stipulated that absent evidence of those fires, he would be unable to prove his failure to warn claims, and therefore, entry of summary judgment was proper. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in its application of Virginia law governing admissibility of other similar occurrences and in excluding evidence of four of the other Windstar van fires; and (2) the evidence of three of the Windstar van fires was inadmissible. Remanded. View "Funkhouser v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law