Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mary Arnold, who was injured in an automobile collision, brought a negligence action against the other driver, Jonathan Wallace, who was uninsured. Travelers Insurance Company, Arnold's carrier, defended the suit pursuant to its uninsured motorist coverage. The jury awarded a verdict for Arnold in the amount of $9,134. Arnold appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in admitting medical records under the business records exception, as there was established a sufficient foundation for the admission of the evidence; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in finding an expert physician qualified to testify when her partner previously had been retained by the opposing counsel. View "Arnold v. Wallace" on Justia Law

The AES Corporation paid premiums to Steadfast Insurance Company for commercial general liability (CGL) policies. In February 2008, the village and city of Kivalina, a community located on an Alaskan barrier island, filed a lawsuit (the Complaint) in the U.S. district court against AES and other defendants for allegedly damaging the village by causing global warming through emission of greenhouse gases. Steadfast provided AES a defense under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory judgment action, claiming that it did not owe AES a defense or indemnity regarding the Complaint. The circuit court granted Steadfast's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Complaint did not allege property damage caused by an "occurrence" as that term was defined in AES's contracts of insurance with Steadfast. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kivalina did not allege that its property damage was the result of a fortuitous event or accident, and therefore, such a loss was not covered under the relevant CGL policies. View "AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A putative class action was filed in the U.S. District Court. The representative plaintiffs in the class action asserted claims of strict liability, negligence and medical monitoring against Merck & Co., Inc. Class certification was eventually denied, and the class action was dismissed. Prior to the dismissal of the putative class action, four Virginia residents filed individual state law actions against Merck in the southern district of New York, asserting federal diversity jurisdiction. The district court granted Merck's motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs' actions were untimely under Virginia's two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, and the pendency of the putative class action did not toll Virginia's limitations period for the four plaintiffs' state law claims. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals, and the Virginia Supreme Court accepted certification to determine questions of state law. The Court held that Virginia law recognizes neither equitable nor statutory tolling of a Virginia statute of limitations for unnamed putative class members due to the pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction. View "Casey v. Merck & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Namina Barber was a passenger in an automobile that was hit by a vehicle driven by Billy Wakole. As a result of her injuries Barber brought an action against Wakole, who admitted liability for the accident but disputed the extent of Barber's damages. The jury returned a verdict for $30,000 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in allowing counsel for Barber to argue in his closing that each item of damage was separate and had a fixed numerical value and permitting him to enumerate each item of damages to the jury, as the argument made by Barber for specific amounts for various types of damages did not invade the province of the jury nor did it violate Va. Code Ann. 8.01-379.1. View "Wakole v. Barber" on Justia Law

Su, a citizen of the People's Republic of China, was accepted by the Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) after attending high school in Minnesota. At the time Su matriculated at VCU, he was classified as an out-of-state student for tuition purposes. Su subsequently sought to change his classification to in-state status and filed an application for in-state tuition benefits. VCU's residency appeals officer denied Su's application, finding that federal law prohibited an F-1 visa holder to establish Virginia domicile. VCU's residency appeals committee denied Su's appeal. The circuit court reversed, holding (1) VCU was incorrect in asserting that Su had no domicile and that he was an V-1 visa holder, rather than a permanent resident, when he matriculated; and (2) Su had established that he was domiciled in Virginia and had abandoned any previous domicile for at least one year prior o the date of entitlement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in reversing VCU's decision denying Su's application for in-state tuition benefits and that VCU's decision could not reasonably be said to be contrary, capricious or otherwise contrary to law. View "Va. Commonwealth Univ. v. Su" on Justia Law

Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority (NRHA) filed a complaint against the St. Joe Company and Advantis Real Estate Services Company alleging unjust enrichment and seeking imposition of a constructive trust and recovery of funds supplied by NRHA to its agent, Advantis, for the payment of contractors who had performed services for NRHA. St. Joe held a perfected secured interest in Advantis's operating account and exercised its rights as a secured creditor over that account to have funds from Advantis's account, including those entrusted to Advantis as NRHA's agent, transferred to a St. Joe account. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of NRHA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the imposition of a constructive was was proper and necessary to prevent a failure of justice and unjust enrichment. View "St. Joe Co. v. Norfolk Redev. and Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Rappahannock Goodwill Industries (RGI) enterd into an agreement with Specialty Hospitals of Washington. When Specialty Hospitals failed to perform under the agreement, RGI filed a complaint against Specialty Hospitals, asserting claims for breach of contract, conversion, and quantum meruit. No responsive pleadings were filed on behalf of Specialty Hospitals, and the circuit court entered default judgment in favor of RGI. Specialty Hospitals then filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, alleging that service of process was defective, that RGI's claims were against a different entity, and that RGI had erroneously sued Specialty Hospitals. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) failing to find actual notice to Specialty Hospitals, and (2) failing to consider all the factors set forth in Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3:19(d)(1). View "Specialty Hosps. v. Rappahannock Goodwill Indus." on Justia Law

Thomas Porter was convicted in the circuit court of the capital murder of a law enforcement officer, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and grand larceny. The trial court sentenced Porter to death plus twenty-two years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court subsequently dismissed Porter's petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding (1) Porter was not denied the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury because a juror failed to disclose during voir dire that his brother was employed as a deputy sheriff, as Porter failed to demonstrate that the juror failed to answer honestly a material question during voir dire; (2) the Commonwealth did not fail to disclose exculpatory information as required by Brady v. Maryland; and (3) Porter failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient for failing to investigate Porter's childhood and educational history. View "Porter v. Warden" on Justia Law

Patricia LaCava was convicted in the circuit court of two counts of embezzlement. LaCava commenced her appeal pro se. LaCava filed a timely notice of appeal and asked the court reporter to order transcripts of the trial proceedings. LaCava subsequently secured representation by appellate counsel, who discovered that the transcripts had not been filed within the sixty-day period required by Va. R. Crim. App. 5A:8(a). After filing the transcripts by hand, counsel filed a motion to extend the deadline for filing transcripts. The court of appeals denied the motion and thereafter denied LaCava's petition for appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) the court of appeals abused its discretion in denying LaCava's motion to extend the deadline for filing her transcript, as LaCava showed good cause to extend the period for filing transcripts; and (2) the court of appeals erred in denying LaCava's petition for appeal because the order was predicated solely on the absence of a transcript or statement of facts. View "LaCava v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Robert Hardick, a Navy sailor, filed suit under general maritime law against John Crane, Inc. (JCI) seeking compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that he was exposed to asbestos contained in products manufactured by JCI and that he contracted mesothelioma as a result. Robert died prior to trial, and his action was revived as a wrongful death action by his wife, Margaret. The jury returned a verdict for Margaret, and the trial court required JCI to pay a sum of $2,988,741 to Margaret. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court erred by permitting the jury to award Margaret nonpecuniary damages for the wrongful death of Robert, as Robert was a seaman and thus precluded from recovering nonpecuniary damages. Remanded. View "John Crane, Inc. v. Hardick" on Justia Law