Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court upheld two capital murder convictions against Alfredo Rolando Prieto as well as convictions for rape, grand larceny, and two counts of felonious use of a firearm. The Court remanded for resentencing based on a finding of error in the penalty phase of the trial. Following a new penalty phase, the circuit court entered a final order imposing the death penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed after addressing Prieto's several assignments of error, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment and that there was no reason to commute or set aside the sentences of death. View "Prieto v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Northern Virginia Real Estate and its principal broker, Lauren Kivlighan, filed an eight-count second amended complaint against McEnearney Associates, its real estate agent Karen Martins, and David and Donna Gavin (collectively, Defendants), alleging conspiracy to harm in business, interference with contract expectancy, and defamation. The trial court eventually entered an order granting Plaintiffs' motion to nonsuit all counts and dismissing the case as to all counts and all parties. Defendants subsequently filed motions for sanctions against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel, Forrest Walpole, seeking attorneys' fees and costs and arguing that Plaintiffs violated Va. Code Ann. 8.01-271.1 by filing the suit without any basis in fact, without support in law, and with improper purposes. The trial court granted the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it imposed sanctions jointly and severally against Plaintiffs and Walpole; and (2) the trial court applied an objective standard of reasonableness in concluding that the facts of this case could not support a reasonable belief that the Plaintiffs' claims along with the damages sought were well grounded in fact or law as required by section 8.01-271.1. View "N. Va. Real Estate v. Martin" on Justia Law

Hugh Britt, an employee of CP&O, LLC, was fatally injured while loading and unloading cargo at the Norfolk International Terminals (NIT) when a straddle carrier that Orion Parker, a stevedore employed by VIT, was operating ran into the side of the container being pulled by the hustler operated by Britt. Virgil Moore, as administrator of Britt's estate, filed a wrongful death action against Parker and Virginia International Terminals (VIT), asserting negligence and premises liability claims. VIT and Parker filed a plea in bar seeking the dismissal of the action on the basis that the Virginia Port Authority (VPA) serves as the statutory employer of the CP&O and VIT employees loading and unloading vessels at NIT, and therefore, Moore's claims were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act (Act). The circuit court determined that the parties were statutory employees of the VPA and sustained the plea in bar. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in its ruling that the parties were statutory employees of the VPA and therefore subject to the exclusivity provisions of the Act. View "Moore v. Va. Int'l Terminals" on Justia Law

Judy Maretta, as the named beneficiary of a Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) policy, received FEGLI benefits upon the death of her ex-husband. Jacqueline Hillman, the widow of the deceased, filed an action against Maretta, claiming that pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 20-111.1(D), Maretta was liable to her for the death benefits received. Maretta claimed that the state law was preempted by 5 U.S.C. 8705 and 8705 because the state statutes granted FEGLI benefits to someone other than the named beneficiary in violation of FEGLIA's terms. The circuit court concluded that section 20-111.1(D) was not preempted by FEGLIA and entered judgment against Maretta. The Supreme Court reversed and entered judgment for Maretta, holding that because Congress intended for FEGLI benefits to be paid and to belong to a designated beneficiary, FEGLIA preempts section 20-111.1(D). View "Maretta v. Hillman" on Justia Law

Mark Lahey was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder. The court of appeals and Supreme Court refused Lahey's petitions for appeal. Lahey subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Lahey submitted his habeas petition for filing on the last day of the limitations period but did not complete payment of the filing fee until days later. The circuit court dismissed the petition as untimely under Va. Code Ann. 8.01-654(A)(2) upon determining that, under the express requirements of Va. Code Ann. 8.01-655, the petition could not be filed, or deemed filed, without proper payment of the filing fee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Lahey's habeas petition was time-barred under section 8.01-654(A)(2). View "Lahey v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Jean Moreau & Associates brought this suit against the Health Center Commission for the County of Chesterfield (HCC), a municipal corporation, seeking a declaratory judgment and alleging claims for breach of contract and quantum meruit. The circuit court dismissed Jean Moreau's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Jean Moreau did not comply with the mandatory procedural requirements of the Virginia Public Procurement Act in bringing its breach of contract claim against HCC, the circuit court did not err in concluding that the claim was barred; and (2) the circuit court did not err in concluding that Jean Moreau's quantum meruit claim was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity for HCC's development and operation of Springdale, an independent living facility, because (i) municipal corporations performing governmental functions are immune from quantum meruit claims, (ii) HCC was not entitled to absolute immunity simply because it was created by a county and not a municipality, but (iii) Springdale served a governmental function. View "Jean Moreau & Assocs., Inc. v. Health Ctr. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 1994, Michael Haas was convicted at a bench trial in the circuit court of sodomy committed upon his two sons in 1992 and 1993, when they were eleven and nine years of age, respectively. After Haas' petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied, Hass filed a petition for a writ of actual innocence based on non-biological evidence, including recantation evidence. The court of appeals denied Haas' request to refer the case to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing and dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in (1) declining to refer the case back to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing, and (2) finding that Haas failed to carry his burden of proof and, accordingly, granting the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss his petition. View "Haas v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Linda Eberhardt, an employee of the Fairfax County School Board and a member of the Fairfax County Employees' Retirement Systems (FCERS), was injured during the course of her employment. Eberhardt applied for service-connected disability retirement benefits. The FCERS Board of Trustees denied Eberhardt's application for service-connected disability retirement benefits but awarded ordinary disability retirement benefits. Eberhardt appealed under Va. Code Ann. 51.1-823. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal because section 51.1-823 applied only to police officers' retirement systems in counties with the urban executive form of government. The court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly ruled that section 51.1-823 did not confer jurisdiction upon it to hear Eberhardt's appeal because the word "board" as used in section 51.1-823 did not encompass the board of any retirement system created by a county having an urban executive form of government. View "Eberhardt v. Fairfax County Employees' Ret. Sys. Bd. of Trs." on Justia Law

An unincorporated association purporting to represent the general public filed a complaint for injunctive relief against several property owners, alleging that the property owners blocked access to a public road by the general public by erecting pole gates. In their answer, the property owners denied that the road was a public road. The circuit court granted injunctive relief to the association after finding that the association had proven that the general public was entitled to unrestricted use of the road. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in finding there had been no dedication and acceptance of the road as a public road; (2) the circuit court erred in finding that the association had established that the road was public solely by virtue of its long and continuous use by the general public and recognition of that use by the county; and (3) the circuit court erred in its ruling insofar as it would allow a traditional prescriptive easement could be created in favor of the general public, but the court's ruling that prescription had not been proven was nonetheless a correct result in light of its finding that there had been no acceptance. View "Dykes v. Friends of the C.C.C. Road" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a guilty plea, Steven DeMille was convicted of rape. Before DeMille's release from incarceration, the attorney general filed a petition seeking the civil commitment of DeMille as a sexually violent predator. After a bench trial, the circuit court entered an order declaring DeMille to be a sexually violent predator. At issue on appeal was whether in a proceeding under the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, the determination that the respondent is likely to engage in sexually violent acts must be based solely on expert testimony that states an opinion to that effect in express terms. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the factual determination of whether a respondent is a sexually violent predator likely to engage in sexually violent acts is to be based on the totality of the record, including but not limited to expert testimony. View "DeMille v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law