Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brenda Collins filed a motion for judgment against Verbena Askew, a former circuit court judge, among others, alleging defamation, conspiracy and breach of contract. Collins settled with the other defendants, and the case proceeded to trial against Askew. The jury returned a verdict in Collins' favor on the defamation claim. Askew subsequently moved the trial court to set aside the verdict or to reduce it by the sums Collins had already received from the other defendants, arguing that a reduction was required by Va. Code Ann. 8.01-35.1.The trial court denied the motions, and Askew appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to set aside the jury's verdict or in refusing to apply section 8.01-35.1 to reduce the amount of the judgment. View "Askew v. Collins" on Justia Law

After the decedent's death, the decedent's daughter probated her 2008 will and qualified as executor for the will. The decedent's remaining children sued the daughter to challenge the will. The trial court ruled that the 2008 will had been impeached and Decedent's 2007 will should proceed to probate, holding (1) Decedent lacked testamentary capacity when she executed her contested will, and (2) the contested will was the result of undue influence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred where (1) the trial court's decision that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity was based on an incorrect view of the law and an improper weighing of the evidence; and (2) the evidence in this case rebutted the presumption of undue influence. Remanded. View "Weedon v. Weedon" on Justia Law

Defendant Roger Stevens was found guilty of, among other crimes, two counts of murder, two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of murder, conspiracy to commit robbery, and malicious bodily injury. The court of appeals affirmed Stevens' conviction. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his statement to police during a custodial interrogation because, in light of the circumstances, Defendant's request for a lawyer was ambiguous and, therefore, the officers were entitled to ask further clarifying questions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, the officers could have reasonably viewed Stevens' statement as ambiguous, and thus they were permitted to ask Stevens clarifying questions. View "Stevens v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Albemarle County enacted a zoning ordinance governing construction on slopes within the county. Under the waiver provision of the county code, the planning commission was authorized to grant a waiver from the restrictions otherwise imposed by the ordinance. Kent Sinclair, who owned property in the county, filed a complaint seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the county exceeded the power delegated to it by the General Assembly in violation of the Dillon Rule because its procedure for considering waiver applications was not authorized by state law. The circuit court granted summary judgment against Sinclair. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment that the decision to grant or deny waiver applications may be delegated to the planning commission, as the delegation was legislative in nature and not authorized by state law. Accordingly, in enacting the waiver provision, the county exceeded its authority from the General Assembly in violation of the Dillon Rule and the waiver provision was void. Remanded. View "Sinclair v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC" on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working for Employer's sheep and wool business, Cestari. Employer failed to maintain workers' compensation insurance for Cestari. Employee filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer and Cestari, as well as a complaint against Employer and Cestari, seeking damages for negligence. The workers' compensation commissioner determined that Employee was entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Finding that Employee had pursued his workers' compensation claim to a final order and that he had a remedy for collection of his workers' compensation award against Cestari and/or the Uninsured Employers' Fund, the circuit court dismissed Employee's civil complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employee had received the recovery he sought under the Workers' Compensation Act, and thus, the circuit court did not err in ruling that Employee could not pursue an action at law against Employer after obtaining a final collectible award of workers' compensation benefits. View "Redifer v. Chester" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld two capital murder convictions against Alfredo Rolando Prieto as well as convictions for rape, grand larceny, and two counts of felonious use of a firearm. The Court remanded for resentencing based on a finding of error in the penalty phase of the trial. Following a new penalty phase, the circuit court entered a final order imposing the death penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed after addressing Prieto's several assignments of error, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment and that there was no reason to commute or set aside the sentences of death. View "Prieto v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Northern Virginia Real Estate and its principal broker, Lauren Kivlighan, filed an eight-count second amended complaint against McEnearney Associates, its real estate agent Karen Martins, and David and Donna Gavin (collectively, Defendants), alleging conspiracy to harm in business, interference with contract expectancy, and defamation. The trial court eventually entered an order granting Plaintiffs' motion to nonsuit all counts and dismissing the case as to all counts and all parties. Defendants subsequently filed motions for sanctions against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel, Forrest Walpole, seeking attorneys' fees and costs and arguing that Plaintiffs violated Va. Code Ann. 8.01-271.1 by filing the suit without any basis in fact, without support in law, and with improper purposes. The trial court granted the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it imposed sanctions jointly and severally against Plaintiffs and Walpole; and (2) the trial court applied an objective standard of reasonableness in concluding that the facts of this case could not support a reasonable belief that the Plaintiffs' claims along with the damages sought were well grounded in fact or law as required by section 8.01-271.1. View "N. Va. Real Estate v. Martin" on Justia Law

Hugh Britt, an employee of CP&O, LLC, was fatally injured while loading and unloading cargo at the Norfolk International Terminals (NIT) when a straddle carrier that Orion Parker, a stevedore employed by VIT, was operating ran into the side of the container being pulled by the hustler operated by Britt. Virgil Moore, as administrator of Britt's estate, filed a wrongful death action against Parker and Virginia International Terminals (VIT), asserting negligence and premises liability claims. VIT and Parker filed a plea in bar seeking the dismissal of the action on the basis that the Virginia Port Authority (VPA) serves as the statutory employer of the CP&O and VIT employees loading and unloading vessels at NIT, and therefore, Moore's claims were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act (Act). The circuit court determined that the parties were statutory employees of the VPA and sustained the plea in bar. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in its ruling that the parties were statutory employees of the VPA and therefore subject to the exclusivity provisions of the Act. View "Moore v. Va. Int'l Terminals" on Justia Law

Judy Maretta, as the named beneficiary of a Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) policy, received FEGLI benefits upon the death of her ex-husband. Jacqueline Hillman, the widow of the deceased, filed an action against Maretta, claiming that pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 20-111.1(D), Maretta was liable to her for the death benefits received. Maretta claimed that the state law was preempted by 5 U.S.C. 8705 and 8705 because the state statutes granted FEGLI benefits to someone other than the named beneficiary in violation of FEGLIA's terms. The circuit court concluded that section 20-111.1(D) was not preempted by FEGLIA and entered judgment against Maretta. The Supreme Court reversed and entered judgment for Maretta, holding that because Congress intended for FEGLI benefits to be paid and to belong to a designated beneficiary, FEGLIA preempts section 20-111.1(D). View "Maretta v. Hillman" on Justia Law

Mark Lahey was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder. The court of appeals and Supreme Court refused Lahey's petitions for appeal. Lahey subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Lahey submitted his habeas petition for filing on the last day of the limitations period but did not complete payment of the filing fee until days later. The circuit court dismissed the petition as untimely under Va. Code Ann. 8.01-654(A)(2) upon determining that, under the express requirements of Va. Code Ann. 8.01-655, the petition could not be filed, or deemed filed, without proper payment of the filing fee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Lahey's habeas petition was time-barred under section 8.01-654(A)(2). View "Lahey v. Johnson" on Justia Law