Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following a bench trial, the circuit court found Jerrod Quarles guilty of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Quarles' motion to suppress where the police impermissibly reinitiated communication with Quarles after he invoked his right to counsel in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment, and therefore, Quarles' subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights was not voluntary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Quarles' motion to suppress where the police officer would not have known that Quarles was likely to respond to his statement and Quarles was not particularly susceptible to exposure to such statements. View "Commonwealth v. Quarles" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a bail bondsman licensed in another state but not in Virginia had the authority to enter Virginia and apprehend a fugitive bailee. In a bench trial, Defendant, an out-of-state bail bondsman, was convicted of attempted abduction and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the General Assembly plainly manifested its intent to abrogate the common law rule allowing out-of-state bail bondsmen and bounty hunters to enter Virginia to apprehend fugitive bailees; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to establish the specific intent necessary to support a conviction of attempted abduction. View "Collins v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Geographic Services, Inc. (GSI) hired Anthony Collelo for work that exposed Collelo to confidential information and alleged trade secrets. GSI and Collelo executed an employment agreement that included a non-disclosure provision prohibiting Collelo from disclosing GSI's confidential information. Collelo later resigned from GSI and was hired by Boeing. GSI subsequently filed suit against Boeing, Autometric, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Boeing, and Collelo (collectively, Defendants), alleging breach of contract, violation of the Trade Secrets Act, and tortious interference with GSI's contract with Collelo. The trial court granted Defendants' motion to strike and dismissed GSI's entire case with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court erred when it dismissed GSI's claims under the Trade Secrets Act; (2) the trial court did not err when it dismissed GI's remaining claims; and (3) the trial court did not err when it denied Collelo's motion for attorneys' fees in relation to GSI's breach of contract claim. Remanded for a new trial on GSI's claims under the Trade Secrets Act. View "Collelo v. Geographic Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In this action, the trial court granted summary judgment against a locality, holding it liable to landowners under the State Water Control Law, Va. Code Ann. 62.1-44.2 through -44.34:28, in particular Code 62.1-44.34:18(C) of the Oil Discharge Law, for the contamination of groundwater by leachate and landfill gas. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to the landowners and finding the locality liable under the Oil Discharge Law, as the Oil Discharge Law does not apply to the passive, gradual seepage of leachate and landfill gas into groundwater. View "Campbell County v. Royal" on Justia Law

At a bench trial, the circuit court found Curtis Branham guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The court of appeals affirmed. Branham appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress the Commonwealth's evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Branham's motion to suppress where the arresting officer's search of Branham's person and vehicle and the results of those searches were not fruits of an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the circuit court did not err in admitting the certificate of analysis of the cocaine into evidence where the chain of custody evidence was sufficient. View "Branham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the court of appeals erred in (1) reversing a circuit court's judgment and applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to the State Water Control Board's decision to reissue a Virginia pollutant discharge elimination system permit to Virginia Electric and Power Company for its nuclear power station; and (2) reversing the circuit court and affirming the Board's determination that the discharge of heated water from the station into a waste heat treatment facility, classified as a "waste treatment facility" under state and federal regulations, did not require a separate discharge permit. For the reasons stated in Commonwealth v. Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, Inc., the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Blue Ridge Envtl. Defense League v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Smith for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Two days later, Smith applied for the purchase of a semi-automatic pistol. Smith answered that he was not under indictment for a felony on the form prepared by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives of the United States Department of Justice (the ATF form). The record contained no evidence that Smith, when executing the ATF form, was aware that the grand jury had returned an indictment against him. Smith was indicted for making a false statement on a firearm purchase form, and the circuit court ultimately found Smith guilty. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, vacated the conviction, and dismissed the indictment, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of "willfully and intentionally making a materially false statement" on a form executed in connection with the purchase of a firearm because there was no evidence to support a finding that Smith knew that he had been indicted when he signed the ATF form. View "Smith v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After Wife filed a complaint for divorce from Husband, the trial court conducted an equitable distribution hearing, pursuant to which it determined that, because Wife exercised some of the options with separate funds, the entirety of Wife's stock awards were her separate property. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court finding that the stock awards were Mary's separate property but for different reasons, holding that the stock awards were not marital property because they did not vest during the marriage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in its classification of the stock awards based solely on the date of vesting. Remanded. View "Schuman v. Schuman" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Ruhlin filed a complaint against Mariam Samaan, seeking damages for injuries he suffered in an automobile accident with Samaan. The jury found in favor of Ruhlin and awarded him $5,000 in damages. Ruhlin appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in ruling on two evidentiary issues during the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the circuit court did not err in (1) permitting the use of a transcript of a recorded statement to refresh a witness's recollection and finding that the admission did not implicate the rule prohibiting the use of a written statement to directly impeach a witness; and (2) ruling that a witness's testimony concerning Ruhlin's prior consistent statements was not admissible into evidence. View "Ruhlin v. Samaan" on Justia Law

Dewey Monroe, a member of a limited liability company, died. Through his will, Dewey bequeathed his entire estate to his daughter, Janet. Janet asserted that Dewey transferred his membership in the company to her. Lou Ann Monroe, the company's managing member, responded that Janet had inherited only Dewey's right to share in profits and losses of the company and to receive distributions to which he would be entitled. Janet filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking declaratory judgment that she had inherited her father's full membership in the company and that Lou Ann and Joseph Monroe, who was named in the company's operating agreement as a successor managing member, had been validly removed from their positions. The circuit court ruled that Janet was not a member of the company and thus lacked the authority to remove Lou Ann and Joseph from their positions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the company's operating agreement lacked specific language that would constitute an exception to the rule of dissociation set forth in Va. Code Ann. 13.1-1040.1; and (2) therefore, Dewey was dissociated from the company upon his death and Janet became a mere assignee, entitled only to Dewey's financial interest. View "Ott v. Monroe" on Justia Law