Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

George Christian filed petitions for temporary injunction and declaratory relief, alleging that the clerk of the State Corporation Commission (SCC) failed to provide requested public records relating to all overpayments or unused payments that the Commission's authority to order a refund had lapsed, and any complaints or grievances arising therefrom. The SCC dismissed the petition, finding (1) no controversy existed given the clerk's timely response to Christian's request for records; and (2) because no controversy existed, it was not necessary to address Christian's other arguments, including whether the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) was applicable to the SCC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a live controversy persisted because Christian would be entitled to recover his costs and fees if he prevailed; (2) however, the VFOIA was inapplicable to the SCC; and (3) therefore, Christian's assignments of error were resolved or rendered moot. View "Christian v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Calvin Bowman was found guilty of robbery, abduction, and two counts of use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The court of appeals and Supreme Court affirmed. Bowman subsequently filed petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Bowman's claim that the Commonwealth failed to correct false testimony of its witness was barred because this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at trial and on appeal; (2) evidence of the lack of Bowman's DNA on a piece of evidence did not prejudice him under the Strickland v. Washington standard; (3) the lack of evidence on a particular piece of clothing recovered from Bowman when he was arrested did not prejudice him under the Strickland standard; and (4) the introduction of evidence by Bowman's expert that confirmed the existence of his fingerprints at the scene of the crime but provided the opportunity for a different explanation did not prejudice him under the Strickland standard. View "Bowman v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant James Bevel was convicted in a jury trial for having sexual relations with his daughter. Bevel's counsel filed a notice of appeal, after which Bevel died. Counsel filed a motion to abate conviction ab initio, which the circuit court denied after finding that the Commonwealth had established good cause for not abating Bevel's conviction. The court of appeals affirmed. Later, the court of appeals entered an order in the merits appeal dismissing the appeal as moot. At issue was whether to abate a conviction ab initio when the defendant has died while his appeal was pending or to dismiss the appeal and leave the conviction intact. The Supreme Court (1) held that the question of whether a criminal conviction necessarily will abate upon the death of the defendant while an appeal is pending or whether there should be a good cause exception in that policy is appropriately decided by the legislature, not the courts; (2) vacated the judgment of the court of appeals applying the abatement doctrine; and (3) affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in the merits appeal, under the specific facts of this case, holding that Bevel's death rendered the appeal of his conviction moot. View "Bevel v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant Jerry Anderson was found guilty of fellatio by force and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. The court of appeals denied his appeal. At issue was whether prior consistent statements made by the complaining witness were properly admitted in evidence to rehabilitate the witness after her impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in admitting the victim's prior consistent statements and any error by the circuit court in admitting parts of the prior consistent statements that were overly repetitious was harmless under the circumstances; and (2) Defendant had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice was reached. View "Anderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Wife sought to collect installments of child support that were due between the years 1967 and 1982. The circuit court determined the total amount of support arrearages due Wife was $73,629. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the parties' 1966 child support order created a judgment or judgments that triggered the running of the twenty-year statute of limitations set forth in Va. Code Ann. 8.01-251(A), therefore barring Wife's enforcement of the child support order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) each installment payment ordered by the court in its 1966 decree became a judgment on the date such payment was due if it was not paid; (2) all support obligations ordered by the divorce decree became due and owing in 1982, when the youngest child for whom Husband owed support reached the age of eighteen, and thus created judgments on or before that date; and (3) this action to collect past due child support obligations, based on the 1966 decree, was filed more than twenty years after any payments ordered by the decree became judgments by operation of law, and was barred pursuant to section 8.01-251(A). Final judgment entered for Husband. View "Adcock v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a property owner within the Lee's Crossing subdivision, sought declaratory and injunctive relief and an award of monetary damages against Defendants, the Lee's Crossing Homeowners Association, the developer of the subdivision, and the general partner, alleging that the Association had perpetrated the misuse of power and other unlawful activities by permitting the developer and general partner to exercise authority under the Lee's Crossing Homeowners Association Declaration to unilaterally amend the Declaration's provisions to the detriment of the individual property owners within Lee's Crossing. At issue between the parties was whether certain provisions of the Virginia Property Owners' Association Act (POAA) restricted the declarant of a recorded declaration creating a property owners' association from unilaterally amending that declaration under its express term providing for such authority. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the POAA did not bar a declarant from providing in a declaration the power to unilaterally amend the declaration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the Declaration provision at issue was not inconsistent with the provisions of the POAA. View "Zinone v. Lee's Crossing Homeowners Ass'n" on Justia Law

A jury found Dustin Turner guilty of abduction with intent to defile and first-degree felony murder. Billy Brown, the other person implicated in the crime, later confessed in a signed affidavit that he alone killed the victim. Based on this recantation, Turner filed a petition for a writ of actual innocence based on non-biological evidence. After remanding the matter to the circuit court to further develop the facts, the court of appeals granted Turner's request for a writ of actual innocence and vacated his convictions. Subsequently, the court of appeals granted the Commonwealth's petition for a rehearing and dismissed Turner's petition for a writ of actual innocence. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in dismissing Turner's petition and in denying his request to vacate his convictions because Turner did not meet his evidentiary burden of providing that no rational trier of fact could find Turner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of abduction with intent to defile as nothing in Brown's recantation or the circuit court's factual findings had any bearing on the question presented in the petition. View "Turner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A limited liability company (MIC) was formed for the purpose of building and operating a hotel. The original members of MIC were a revocable trust (the Trust), trustee Michael Siska, and Thomas, Jane, and Jason Dowdy. Later, Thomas and Jane Dowdy transferred, without the Trust's involvement, MIC's assets to Milestone Development, the Dowdy's family company. The Trust filed an amended complaint derivatively on behalf of MIC against Defendants, Milestone and the Dowdys. In its amended complaint, the Trust claimed that the transfer of assets to Milestone was not in the best interests of MIC or its members and alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, unlawful distribution, and conversion, and seeking to recover damages. The Trust, however, did not join MIC as a party to the derivative action. The circuit court dismissed the Trust's amended complaint, holding that the Trust lacked standing to maintain the derivative action on behalf of MIC because the Trust could not fairly represent the interests of the Defendant shareholders. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it would not entertain the appeal on the merits because MIC was a necessary party to the proceeding and had not been joined. Remanded. View "Michael E. Siska Revocable Trust v. Milestone Dev., L.L.C." on Justia Law

McCarthy Holdings filed a complaint against Vincent Burgher, seeking a declaratory judgment concerning an easement agreement. McCarthy, the owner of the dominant estate, sought a declaration that it had the right, as a matter of law, to bar Burgher, the owner of the servient estate, from any use of the easement. The circuit court found that the easement agreement was unambiguous and that it did not bar Burgher from reasonable use of the easement area. McCarthy appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in construing the easement agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying McCarthy's request to bar Burgher, as a matter of law, from any use of the easement area based upon the easement agreement; and (2) the circuit court did not improperly consider parol evidence in interpreting the easement agreement. View "McCarthy Holdings L.L.C. v. Burgher" on Justia Law

Justine Critzer died intestate with, apparently, no spouse, siblings, children or parents to survive her. Nancy Donak, the administratrix of Critzer's estate, subsequently discovered that the Mary Kummer ("Mrs. Kummer"), the deceased mother of Richard and Charles Kummer and Jane Kummer Stolte ("Kummer children"), was the biological sister of Critzer. Consequently, the Kummer children were Critzer's closest surviving heirs. After the Kummer children began to administer the estate, Donak filed a motion for rule to show cause against distribution based upon the fact that Mrs. Kummer had been adopted at the age of fifty-three by her aunt by marriage. At a hearing to determine the effect of Mrs. Kummer's adoption, the court held (1) the Kummer children were not Critzer's heirs at law because Mrs. Kummer's adoption severed their legal ties to Critzer and her estate, and (2) Virginia's statutory scheme does not distinguish between the adoption of an adult and the adoption of a minor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that the Kummer children were not heirs-at-law of the Critzer estate because their mother's adult adoption severed their inheritance rights. View "Kummer v. Donak" on Justia Law