Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Harry Kelso was convicted in the Circuit Court of Hanover County of three counts of causing a juvenile to assist in the distribution of marijuana to a third party in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-255(A)(ii). Kelso appealed, arguing that venue in Hanover County was improper because he did not undertake any action relating to the sale of marijuana there. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed. Although Kelso's distribution of marijuana to the juvenile occurred solely in another county, the juvenile distributed the marijuana he received from Kelso to a third party in Hanover County. Because one of the acts which must occur for a violation of 18.2-255(A)(ii) is the juvenile's assistance in the distribution of the contraband to a third party, the Court held that the place where that act occurred is an appropriate venue for prosecution. View "Kelso v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2005, David Eastlack was charged with malicious wounding. The circuit court found Eastlack not guilty by reason of insanity. In 2009, Eastlack filed a petition in the circuit court seeking expungement of the police and court records pertaining to the malicious wounding charge pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 19.2-392.2. The court denied the petition. Eastlack appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Eastlack failed to establish the existence of one of the three criteria listed in the statute as a prerequisite to his right to seek expungement. As Eastlack did not meet the other criteria, the Court confined its analysis to whether Eastlack was acquitted of his crime. Because a person found not guilty by reason of insanity has restraints upon his liberty and is not free to resume his life in the community as he would be if he had been acquitted in the usual sense, the Court held the term 'acquitted' in the statute does not include acquittals by reason of insanity. View "Eastlack v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Fairfax County filed a petition in the general district court, seeking an order declaring Dolores Davis to be an unfit pet owner. The general district court entered the order, and Davis appealed to the circuit court. The county filed a motion to nonsuit the case, which the circuit court granted. The county then filed a new petition in the general district court. The general district court dismissed the petition on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction, and the county appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court then entered an order declaring Davis to be an unfit pet owner, and Davis appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's exercise of jurisdiction. Davis appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. Because the circuit court's appellate jurisdiction is derivative of the general district court's jurisdiction, the Court held that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to decide the re-filed case on the merits after the general district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Davis v. County of Fairfax" on Justia Law

In 2002, Pauline Dabney was attacked by two pit bull dogs owned by Elease Otey, who had recently died. Otey held an insurance policy issued by Augusta Mutual Insurance Company that contained a condition requiring the insured to give written notice of an accident "as soon as is practical." In 2003, Dabney filed a personal injury action against the administrator of Otey's estate. Although a letter was sent to Augusta in 2004 notifying the insurance company of Dabney's lawsuit, Augusta did not receive it. The circuit court held in favor of Augusta, ruling as a matter of law that Augusta did not receive notice of Dabney's claim before 2005, and therefore notice of the accident and claim was untimely under the terms of the policy. The Supreme Court held that (1) the circuit court did not err in barring the jury from considering whether Augusta discovered the claim in early 2005 when Dabney's amended complaint only alleged that the insurer discovered the claim in 2004; and (2) given the extenuating circumstances in this case, whether the notice was timely was a question of fact upon which reasonable minds could disagree. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Dabney v. Augusta Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

David McNeal was convicted in a bench trial in the circuit court for failing to return rented personal property within ten days after expiration of the rental period in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-118. At trial, the store manager of the rental business testified that she rented an aluminum brake to McNeal on September 18, 2008, and after two or three months elapsed without McNeal returning the brake, she contacted the sheriff's office. On cross-examination, the store manager testified that the deputy returned the brake on September 19, 2008. The circuit court concluded that, considering all the evidence, the equipment was gone for two or three months on a week's rental, and thus the evidence was sufficient for a finding of guilt. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the conflicting evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain McNeal's conviction. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated McNeal's conviction, holding that the circuit court's judgment finding McNeal guilty was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. The Court concluded that the circuit court was entitled to consider all the evidence and to resolve the conflict in the evidence as it did. View "Commonwealth v. McNeal" on Justia Law

Brenda Britt obtained a new car from a car dealership after completing and signing, among other documents, a buyer's order and a retail installment sales contract. After failing to obtain financing for the sale of the car, the dealership repossessed and disposed of the vehicle without providing prior notice to Britt. Britt filed a warrant in debt against the dealership in the city general district court, alleging the dealership violated Article Nine of the UCC, which requires a secured party, after repossessing collateral, to provide the debtor with notice before disposing of the collateral. The district court and trial court both found in favor of Britt. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the dealership was a secured creditor and Britt a debtor under Article Nine. Therefore, the dealership failed to provide Britt the required notice of disposition following repossession required by Article Nine. View "Cappo Management V, Inc. v. Britt" on Justia Law

Police officers asked D'Angelo Brooks for permission to search his house for a weapon after someone reported shots fired. Brooks consented. During the search an officer opened a bag, in which he found cash and cocaine. The officer then asked Brooks if this was his cash and drugs, to which Brooks responded affirmatively. Prior to trial Brooks moved to suppress the cocaine as being beyond the scope of his consent to search and his statement as being fruit of the poisonous tree. The court denied the motion to suppress and found Brooks guilty of possession of cocaine. The court of appeals denied Brooks' petition for appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) the appellate court did not err when it upheld the denial of the motion to suppress the cocaine and Brooks' statement to the officer afterwards because the search of the bag was objectively reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) Brooks' statement was not obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because a reasonable person in Brooks situation would not have believed he was in custody, and therefore no Miranda warning was needed. View "Brooks v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Robert Bennett signed a one-year employment agreement with Sage. That summer, Bennett communicated to Sage that he would require an increase of almost triple his salary or he would transition out of the company. When Sage did not meet his demands, Bennett continued working for Sage but pursued other employment opportunities. Bennett's employment was terminated that fall. Bennett filed a complaint against Sage seeking severance payments. During trial, the circuit court granted Sage's motion to amend its pleadings to include a defense of repudiation and submitted the issue of repudiation to the jury. The jury ruled against Bennett, and Bennett appealed. At issue was whether a party may repudiate his contractual duties after performance has commenced. The Supreme Court held that (1) repudiation may apply to a contract that has been partially performed when future obligations under the contract are repudiated, and (2) the circuit court properly rejected Bennett's argument that he did not repudiate the contract as a matter of law. Based on the evidence, the jury was entitled to conclude that Bennett's communications while he attempted to transition out of the company constituted a repudiation of his future obligations under the contract. View "Bennett v. Sage Payment Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellee John Jennings operates a commercial marina/boatyard. He challenged the local zoning board's authority to regulate the construction of additional mooring slips that would lie beyond the mean low-water mark of a navigable body of water on his property. Appellant also challenged the authority's "special exception permit" ordinance, claiming that the ordinance lacks adequate standards to guide the governing body's decision to grant or deny a permit. On review, the Supreme Court found no errors from the lower court's record on either ground: "the County's zoning authority 'embrace[s] the entirety of [Appellee's] proposed construction, even the portion that 'extends into the Chesapeake Bay's tidal tributaries.'" The Court affirmed the lower court's denial of Appellee's request for declaratory relief.

In December, 2002, Appellee Alyssa Chalifoux saw her family physician after experiencing headaches and other symptoms on the right side of her face. The doctor referred Appellee for an MRI with Appellant Radiology Associates of Richmond. Between 2002 and 2005, Appellee received an MRI approximately every six months, and each time, the reviewing radiologist reported no abnormalities. On her last MRI in October, 2005, the radiologist detected an abnormality in Appellee's right sinus. In his report, the radiologist commented that the abnormality "probably ha[d] been the cause of the patient's clinical symptoms and in retrospect is visible on the previous exams dating to [December, 2002]." Appellee filed suit, alleging that Appellants negligently read and interpreted various radiological studies that would have shown the tumor in her sinus as early as December, 2002. In their answer to the complaint, Appellants asserted that the suit was time-barred by the statute of limitations, and and that the "continuing treatment rule" does not apply because the care she received was episodic. The parties produced competing experts; the court sustained Appellant's plea of the statute of limitations, denied Appellee's motion for reconsideration, and dismissed the case. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that Appellee's treatment over the course of three years created a physician-patient relationship to defeat the assertion that the repeated visits were episodic. The Court held that the circuit court erred by ruling that the statue of limitations had run, and for not applying the continuing treatment rule to Appellee's case. The Court reversed the lower court's dismissal and remanded it for further proceedings.