Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Geoffrey Sanders was convicted by a jury of forcible sodomy, rape, object sexual penetration, and taking indecent liberties with a child. During the trial, the circuit court allowed the commonwealth's medical expert, a doctor, to rely on the results of a laboratory report as the basis of her opinion that the victim had a sexually transmitted infection. Sanders appealed, arguing that this portion of the expert's testimony violated his right to confront witnesses against him as guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The court of appeals found the laboratory report in this instance was not testimonial for purposes of Sixth Amendment confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the laboratory report was for medical treatment purposes as it was created to permit the doctor to medically diagnose and treat the victim for sexually transmitted infections and was thus non-testimonial; and (2) a laboratory technician under these circumstances would not have reason to believe the results of his or her testing would be used in later trial and thus the report and the expert's testimony as to its content were not subject to exclusion under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. View "Sanders v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Gardiner Mulford purchased a tract of land after being advised by the seller that it might be landlocked and reviewing an appraisal that concluded an access easement would need to be acquired. Mulford began to use an old plank road on Walnut Hill Farm Group's land to access his property. Mulford was arrested for trespassing. Mulford then filed a four-count complaint against Walnut Hill, alleging the roadbed was a lawful, recorded easement. The trial court held for Walnut Hill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial court did not err in finding (1) a public body did not accept an offer to dedicate the roadway, and therefore the roadbed was not public; (2) the elements of proof for a prescriptive easement, including use of an easement by prior occupants, were not established, and therefore Mulford was not entitled to a prescriptive easement; and (3) because Mulford did not allege that Walnut Hill made any representation regarding an easement upon which he relied, Walnut Hill was not equitably estopped from denying the easement. View "Mulford v. Walnut Hill Farm Group, L.L.C." on Justia Law

In 2005, Southwest Emergency Physicians, Inc. (SWEP) and Alldredge entered into a contract under which SWEP's physician-employees staffed Lewis-Gale's emergency department. The contract provided that it could be terminated by either party without cause. In 2008, Alldredge became involved with some signatories to a letter addressed to the Lewis-Gale administration voicing work-related concerns. Certain Lewis-Gale administrators expressed concern that Alldredge had become involved in the hospital's personnel matters, and SWEP later terminated Alldredge's employment. Alldredge sued Lewis-Gale for tortious interference with her employment contract with SWEP, and the circuit court found in favor of Alldredge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the administrators' statements of intimidation and animus toward Allredge did not rise as a matter of law to the level of "improper methods"- such as fraud, deceit, or defamation - necessary to establish a cause of action for tortious interference with contract expectancy when a contract is terminable at will. View "Lewis-Gale Medical Center v. Alldredge" on Justia Law

Level 3 Communications is a telecommunications company providing wholesale Internet services to major Internet service providers. Level 3 filed applications to correct the amount of its gross receipts certified by the State Corporation Commission (SCC) to the Virginia Department of Taxation Department (Department), asserting that the federal Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) proscribes state taxation of its Internet-related revenues. The SCC concluded that the relevant statutes do not empower the SCC to establish deductions from gross receipts not enumerated in the statutes, and the ITFA does not impact the SCC's duties because the SCC makes no determination of tax liability and imposes no tax. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the SCC properly declined to allow a deduction for Internet-related revenues that the General Assembly did not provide for in the gross receipts statute and that to allow for such a deduction would have required the SCC to exceed its statutory authority. Affirmed. View "Level 3 Communications, L.L.C. v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2004, Campbell was involved in a motor vehicle collision with Kocher. In 2005, Campbell filed for bankruptcy and received a notice of discharge a year later. In 2006, Campbell filed two personal injury actions against Kocher and took nonsuits on both of them. In 2008, Campbell filed his third complaint on the same cause of action. Earlier in 2008 the bankruptcy court reopened Campbell's bankruptcy case, and in the proceeding Campbell listed the personal injury claim as an asset and claimed it as exempt property. In 2009 the court held the cause of action to be exempt. During trial for the personal injury action, Kocher filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting lack of standing and the statute of limitations. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed, holding that (1) Campbell's cause of action became a part of the bankruptcy estate in 2005 and remained an asset of the estate until it was exempted in 2009, and therefore all three complaints were filed when Campbell lacked standing; and (2) because the complaints were legal nullities, they had no tolling effect on the two-year statute of limitation. View "Kocher v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Harry Kelso was convicted in the Circuit Court of Hanover County of three counts of causing a juvenile to assist in the distribution of marijuana to a third party in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-255(A)(ii). Kelso appealed, arguing that venue in Hanover County was improper because he did not undertake any action relating to the sale of marijuana there. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed. Although Kelso's distribution of marijuana to the juvenile occurred solely in another county, the juvenile distributed the marijuana he received from Kelso to a third party in Hanover County. Because one of the acts which must occur for a violation of 18.2-255(A)(ii) is the juvenile's assistance in the distribution of the contraband to a third party, the Court held that the place where that act occurred is an appropriate venue for prosecution. View "Kelso v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2005, David Eastlack was charged with malicious wounding. The circuit court found Eastlack not guilty by reason of insanity. In 2009, Eastlack filed a petition in the circuit court seeking expungement of the police and court records pertaining to the malicious wounding charge pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 19.2-392.2. The court denied the petition. Eastlack appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Eastlack failed to establish the existence of one of the three criteria listed in the statute as a prerequisite to his right to seek expungement. As Eastlack did not meet the other criteria, the Court confined its analysis to whether Eastlack was acquitted of his crime. Because a person found not guilty by reason of insanity has restraints upon his liberty and is not free to resume his life in the community as he would be if he had been acquitted in the usual sense, the Court held the term 'acquitted' in the statute does not include acquittals by reason of insanity. View "Eastlack v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Fairfax County filed a petition in the general district court, seeking an order declaring Dolores Davis to be an unfit pet owner. The general district court entered the order, and Davis appealed to the circuit court. The county filed a motion to nonsuit the case, which the circuit court granted. The county then filed a new petition in the general district court. The general district court dismissed the petition on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction, and the county appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court then entered an order declaring Davis to be an unfit pet owner, and Davis appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's exercise of jurisdiction. Davis appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. Because the circuit court's appellate jurisdiction is derivative of the general district court's jurisdiction, the Court held that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to decide the re-filed case on the merits after the general district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Davis v. County of Fairfax" on Justia Law

In 2002, Pauline Dabney was attacked by two pit bull dogs owned by Elease Otey, who had recently died. Otey held an insurance policy issued by Augusta Mutual Insurance Company that contained a condition requiring the insured to give written notice of an accident "as soon as is practical." In 2003, Dabney filed a personal injury action against the administrator of Otey's estate. Although a letter was sent to Augusta in 2004 notifying the insurance company of Dabney's lawsuit, Augusta did not receive it. The circuit court held in favor of Augusta, ruling as a matter of law that Augusta did not receive notice of Dabney's claim before 2005, and therefore notice of the accident and claim was untimely under the terms of the policy. The Supreme Court held that (1) the circuit court did not err in barring the jury from considering whether Augusta discovered the claim in early 2005 when Dabney's amended complaint only alleged that the insurer discovered the claim in 2004; and (2) given the extenuating circumstances in this case, whether the notice was timely was a question of fact upon which reasonable minds could disagree. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Dabney v. Augusta Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

David McNeal was convicted in a bench trial in the circuit court for failing to return rented personal property within ten days after expiration of the rental period in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-118. At trial, the store manager of the rental business testified that she rented an aluminum brake to McNeal on September 18, 2008, and after two or three months elapsed without McNeal returning the brake, she contacted the sheriff's office. On cross-examination, the store manager testified that the deputy returned the brake on September 19, 2008. The circuit court concluded that, considering all the evidence, the equipment was gone for two or three months on a week's rental, and thus the evidence was sufficient for a finding of guilt. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the conflicting evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain McNeal's conviction. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated McNeal's conviction, holding that the circuit court's judgment finding McNeal guilty was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. The Court concluded that the circuit court was entitled to consider all the evidence and to resolve the conflict in the evidence as it did. View "Commonwealth v. McNeal" on Justia Law