Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, the Board of County Supervisors filed a petition for condemnation in trial court against Appellee's Charles and Anna Dean, seeking to obtain the Deans' property to expand a bus maintenance facility and parking structure. The Deans' property consisted of approximately one acre, and had been used previously as a gas station and transmission repair shop. The County had tried to purchase the property, but had been unable to reach an agreement regarding compensation for the property. Before trial, the County filed a motion in limine requesting the court exclude evidence of a purported comparable sale that the Deans relied on to arrive at a price for their property. At trial, the County's expert appraiser testified that the Deans' property was worth $475,000; the Deans' expert valued the property at $900,000. Ultimately the jury fixed the property's value at $488,750. The Deans filed exceptions to the jury's report that the court overruled and denied. On review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the County's motion in limine and excluding evidence regarding the "comparable sale," and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Dunn, McCormack & MacPherson (Dunn), a Virginia law firm, served as legal counsel to the Fairfax County Redevelopment and Housing Authority for thirty years. Dunn worked for the Authority on an at-will contract for legal representation, which was terminated in September, 2005. Dunn filed a complaint against the County Board of Supervisors, alleging that the Chairman of the Board tortiously interfered with Dunn's contract with the Authority. The circuit court sustained the Board's demurrer, holding that Dunn's complaint failed to state sufficient facts to support a cause of action for intentional interference with a contract. Dunn amended its complaint, but ultimately failed to convince the court to rule in its favor. On appeal, the Supreme Court found the record clearly demonstrated that the circuit court sustained the County's demurrer for failing to "adequately state a prima facie cause of action" and affirmed the lower court's decision.

Bataa Baasanjav rented an automobile from Appellant Enterprise Leasing Company (Enterprise). Baasanjav declined to purchase supplemental liability insurance for the rental. The lease agreement contained an indemnification provision in which the renter would have financial responsibility to Enterprise for any losses associated with the rental. Baasanjav was insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by Appellee Farmers Insurance for his own automobile. The Farmers policy would pay for "all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay. . .because of injury to or destruction of property. . .arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the owned vehicle." Under the terms of the policy, "owned vehicle" included the rental. Baasanjav was involved in an accident with another driver while driving the Enterprise rental. The parties stipulated Baasanjav was liable for damages to the other driver's car; Enterprise paid the damages to the other driver. Enterprise sought indemnification from Baasanjav; Baasanjav refused. Farmers filed a complaint for declaratory relief asking the court to determine whether Enterprise had a right to recover from Farmers or Bassanjav or both, under the terms of the Farmers policy and the Enterprise lease agreement. The circuit court ruled that Farmers is liable to Enterprise for the amount paid to the other driver; Farmers appealed. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Appellant John Gordon suffered a compensible injury by accident while working at Appellee Ford Motor Company's production plant in 2000. Based on this injury, the Workers' Compensation Commission entered a series of awards of compensation to Appellant for various periods of temporary total and temporary partial disability. The last of these awards was in 2003 for temporary partial disability. In 2006, Appellant was temporarily laid off from his position at Ford because the plant was shut down. Appellant filed a change-in-condition application seeking temporary total disability benefits based on lost wages caused by the plant shut down. Ford defended against the 2006 application for benefits, by arguing that the twenty-four month tolling provision in Code §65.2-708 (C) could be triggered only once, when Appellant returned to work in a light duty position in 2000. The commission rejected Ford's argument and awarded Appellant the benefits he requested. On appeal, the full commission held that Appellant's change-in-condition was time barred based on the tolling provision in the code. A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the commission; Ford moved for a hearing en banc, and the court again reversed the commission. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the tolling provision runs anew under each successive award of compensation for a particular compensable injury, and is triggered on the last day for which compensation was paid. "Consequently. . . the statute of limitations was tolled through April 20, 2005 and that [Appellant's] change-in-condition application. . . was not time-barred under the statute."

In 1999, Thomas Laffey was injured when his car was hit by a car owned by Sharon Bass. Sharon's daughter Krystal was the car's primary user; Steven Parent was driving the car at the time of the accident. Sharon had a family automobile insurance policy issued by Appellee Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), which listed the car. The policy insured Sharon, or any resident in her household, or any other person using the car with permission of the named insured, provided his actual use of the car was within the scope of such permission. Steven's mother Annie also had an automobile insurance policy with GEICO. Annie's policy covered bodily injury for those it insured while they operated a car owned by another. After the accident, Laffey presented claims to GEICO under Sharon's and Annie's policies. The claims were denied on the ground that Steven lacked permission to operated the car at the time of the accident. Laffey also submitted a claim to his own automobile insurer, Appellant United Services Automobile Association (USAA), and filed a motion for judgment alleging Steven had been negligent in his operation of the car. GEICO filed a declaratory judgment action against USAA, Annie, Steven, Sharon, Krystal and Laffey seeking a determination that it was not obligated to pay for the accident. The court held that Steven was entitled to coverage under both Sharon's and Annie's policies. GEICO appealed. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's holding and entered final judgment in favor of GEICO.

Appellee Donald Gunter originally filed an action against Appellant Robbie Martin individually and in her capacity as administrator of the estate of George Martin in 2005. Gunter alleged that the decedent died intestate. She listed herself as sole heir, but he was the biological child of the decedent, therefore the list of heirs filed with the estate was incorrect. Gunter petitioned the court to allow an amended list of heirs to be filed; Martin moved to dismiss on the grounds that Gunter failed to bring his action within one year of the decedent's death. The court granted the motion and dismissed the action. In 2009, Gunter filed a complaint for quiet title and for allotment or sale or real property, naming Martin in her individual capacity as sole defendant. Gunter alleged that the decedent died intestate, Martin was his widow, he was the biological son of the decedent, and that the real property in question could not be partitioned conveniently. Martin filed a plea in bar of res judicata, arguing that the relief Gunter seeks relies on a determination of whether he is the decedent's biological child, which had been decided in the 2005 matter. The circuit court sustained the plea in bar. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the remedy sought in the 2005 action was different from the remedy in the 2009 action, and reversed the lower court decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

While sitting in the driver's seat of his parked truck talking with a customer on his cell phone, Appellee Michael Lewis was approached by a ten-year-old child and asked for a ride home. Appellee did not know the child, but offered to give him a ride. As the child got into the truck, Cedrick Williams, who knew neither the child nor Appellee, came from him home and approached the truck, yelling for the child to get out of the truck. Williams called 911, reporting that he witnessed an attempted abduction. Appellant Officer Brian Kei obtained an arrest warrant for Appellee based solely on the report by Williams. Appellee was held for 41 days in jail. After the Assistant Commonwealth Attorney spoke with the child and verified Appellee's version of the incident, charges against Appellee were dropped nolle prosequi. On petition, the circuit court expunged the record of Appellee's arrest, but the police website, as well as several news station websites still reported the incident, quoting arresting officer Kei with statements that proved to be unfounded. Appellee brought suit alleging malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and defamation against Kei; the court entered an order sustaining a demurrer to all claims against Kei. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of the demurrer on all counts except defamation, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that claim.

Appellee Shawn Necaise was arrested on warrants charging felonious disregard of a police officer's signal to stop, and feloniously assaulting an officer engaged in public duties. The court records show the charges were reduced to misdemeanors. Represented by counsel, Appellee plead guilty to both charges; the Commonwealth took nolle prosequi to other pending misdemeanors. The court accepted the pleas, found him guilty of both, and imposed fines and suspended jail time. Two years later, Appellee filed a petition in the circuit court seeking expungement of all police and court records pertaining to the two felony charges and the misdemeanors that had been dismissed nolle prosequi. The court ordered the expungement with regard to the charges disposed of by nolle prosequi, but denied the expungement pertaining to the two felonies. On appeal, the Supreme Court reasoned that because the misdemeanors to which Appellee was convicted were lesser included offenses of the felonies with which he was originally charged, all of the elements of the offenses were subsumed within the felony charges and formed the sole bases for the misdemeanor convictions. "The record as it stands contains a true account of the events that actually occurred and creates no injustice to either party." The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

Appellant Sara Forbes (Trustee) created a trust to convey a parcel of real estate to the City of Newport News in which she acted as trustee. The trust provisions prohibit the trustee from selling the property except to a condemner in the event the property is condemned. The provisions require the trustee to distribute all net income generated by the trust to grantor for her lifetime. The principal of the trust would be distributed to Appellee Riverside Healthcare Association (Riverside). In 2008, the Commonwealth acquired a portion of the property in trust by certificate of take. Because the trustee and Riverside disagreed as to whether the compensation received in the eminent domain action should be allocated to principal or income, they entered an escrow agreement directing the escrow agents to hold the condemnation compensation and disburse the fund in accordance with future directions from the trustee and Riverside. Subsequently, the Trustee sought declaratory relief against Riverside asking that the condemnation compensation be paid as income for distribution to the grantor according to the terms of the trust. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of who got the compensation; the circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Trustee. Riverside appealed, seeking Supreme Court review of whether the state Uniform Principal and Income Act controlled the distribution of the condemnation compensation, and whether the remainder beneficiary could bring suit seeking an equitable accounting of the trust. The Court found the lower court did not err in granting partial summary judgment to the Trustee, but reversed the lower court's ruling on the equitable accounting issue, and remanded for further proceedings.

From March 2005 to November 2007, Appellee Wilma Ruby entered into a total of 33 payday loan agreements with Appellant Cashnet, Inc. The amount of each loan increased over time. Appellee failed to pay her last loan. In 2008, Appellee brought suit against Cashnet alleging that with each loan she made, she was refinancing, renewing or extending the previous loan, in violation of state law. She further alleged that the annual percentage rate for each loan exceeded the finance fee allowed under state law. Appellee sought the return of interest paid or statutory damages and attorney's fees. A bench trial was held on Appellee's claims; the circuit court ruled in Cashnet's favor, holding that the loans did not constitute a refinance, renewal or extension, and were not in violation of the law. On appeal, the Supreme Court gave ordinary meaning to the terms at issue in the lower court's ruling: "refinance" and "renew." The Court found that "refinancing" is the exchange of an old debt for a new one; "renewal" is the recreation of a legal relationship or the replacement of an old contract with a new one. By looking at the substance of the transactions between Cashnet and Appellee, the Court deduced that the proceeds from each new loan were being used to repay the previous loan, therefore each transaction was refinanced. The Court held that Cashnet's practice of making loans to Appellee immediately after she repaid a previous loan was a refinancing in violation of state law. It reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.