Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1925, the owner of a parcel of land adjacent to the James River obtained the right to construct a wharf and pier extending into the river and adjacent to public land, then owned by the Isle of Wight County. Over time, the wharf was extended to include a pavilion and attached piers resting on pilings placed in the subsurface lands of the river, within the area between the mean low-water mark and the line of navigation. Through a chain of successive recorded transfers, the pavilion and piers were acquired by members of the Bracey family, including Appellee R. Forrest Scott. The family performed extensive renovations and began using the pavilions as a family retreat. The pavilion and connecting piers were destroyed by hurricane in 2003, and although a number of pilings that supported the original structures remain in place, there has been no reconstruction. In 2006, Appellant Burwell's Bay Improvement Association received approval to construct a pier from its property into the riparian area formerly containing the pavilion and piers that were destroyed in 2003. In March, 2007, Scott and other members of the Bracey sought a declaratory judgment from the circuit court that they own the riparian and other rights on and adjacent to the public area, to determine the extent of those rights, and to enjoin construction by Appellant that would interfere with the family's rights. The circuit court found that the family failed to establish ownership of the riparian rights by adverse possession or a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to review whether the evidence was sufficient to show that the use of the riparian rights was exclusive and continuous for the required period of time. The Court found because the family chose not to reconstruct after the 2003 hurricane, the piers that remained was not enough to use tacking to establish exclusive and continuous use of the area and riparian rights. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Prior to November, 2006, Grievant Tammy Estep worked for the Virginia Department of Corrections (DOC) as a Superintendent of the Central Virginia Correctional Unit. She had consistently been given good performance reviews until November 13th, when she was involuntarily demoted to a lower position. She filed a grievance that ultimately came before a hearing officer. The officer found the demotion was unwarranted, and ordered the DOC to reinstate Estep to a comparable position as either a Superintendent or Assistant Warden, and that she be reimbursed for any lost pay as a result of the demotion. Estep's former position had been filled; in an attempt to comply with the hearing officer's order, the DOC transferred Estep to a different location, and into a newly-created position with the same rate of pay, but different duties, responsibilities and authority. Estep brought suit at the circuit court seeking implementation of the hearing officer's order. The court held that the DOC failed to implement the hearing officer's order, and ordered Estep be reinstated to her old position since the DOC could not find an adequate substitute. The DOC appealed. The Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the matter, and found that the record supported the circuit court's decision to reinstate Estep to her former position.

This appeal stems from an application made by the City of Virginia Beach to the Virginia Marine Resources Commission (VMRC). The City sought to install a stormwater pipeline over state-owned bottomlands. After a public hearing, the VMRC approved the pipeline project. City residents appealed the decision to the circuit court seeking to enjoin the project. VMRC responded, in part, that the Residents' pleading was insufficient because they did not specify how they were aggrieved by the pipeline project. The City also challenged the Residents' complaint, arguing that it lacked a "proper jurisdictional basis." The circuit court agreed that the Residents' complaint lacked standing and dismissed it, and denied the Residents' motion to amend the petition for appeal. The Residents then raised the matter to the Court of Appeals, and the appellate court reversed the dismissal. On appeal by the City and VMRC, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court misapplied the rule that supported the appellate court's decision, saying the court "misconstrues the role of the rules in such appeals and is inconsistent with established and relevant principles of jurisprudence." The Supreme Court accordingly affirmed the circuit court's decision in favor of the City and VMRC.

Petitioner Corey Smith was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by Richmond police officers for a broken tail light. The officers asked the driver and Petitioner for identification, and processed that information using the police database known as "PISTOL" (Police Information System Totally On Line), which was accessed through a computer in the police patrol car. PISTOL returned an "alert" stating that Petitioner was "probably armed and a narcotics seller/user." On receiving the alert, the officers asked Petitioner out of the car and conducted a pat down search of his person. The officer detected a gun in Petitioner's pocket. Petitioner was arrested and charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of state law. Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the pat down, arguing that the search, based solely on the information in PISTOL was unreasonable and a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion; Petitioner entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Petitioner asserted that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The appellate court concluded that "in the absence of some contemporaneous indication that the individual might be carrying a weapon, the facts do not provide reasonable suspicion to believe he may presently be armed and dangerous" and overturned the lower court's conviction. On review, the Supreme Court holds that the record supports the conclusion of the trial court, that the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify the frisk, and affirmed the conviction.

In April, 2006, Charles Volpe drowned in the Maury River below a low-head dam during a visit to a park owned by the Appellant City of Lexington. His parents S. Charles and Kim Volpe (Appellees) brought suit against the City seeking damages for gross negligence, willful and wanton negligence and public nuisance. The matter proceeded to a jury trial; in the end, the court struck the ordinary negligence claims and refused to instruct the jury on public nuisance. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the gross negligence claim, and the circuit court granted a renewed motion to strike that claim, finding the danger posed by the dam was open and obvious and therefore the City owed no duty to warn Charles. The record reflected that while many people swam in the waters created by the dam without incident, there was a deadly, hidden hydraulic created by an unusually strong current that the City knew existed. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the "natural, ordinarily encountered dangers" of the river were open and obvious to Charles, the hidden hydraulic was not. The Court held that the City had a duty to warn Charles of the hidden dangers, and that the lower court erred by striking the Volpes' claims of gross negligence against the City, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the lower court's judgment striking the claim of willful and wanton negligence.